Two broad traditions of scholarship can be distinguished in the vast literature on the diplomacy of conflict. The diplomatic communication tradition takes the difficulty of credible communication between adversaries as its central problem and analyzes the conditions for informative costly, costless and inadvertent signals as well as the effects on conflict processes of these different forms of communication. A body of empirical work, focused particularly on public coercive diplomacy and alliances, also belongs to this approach. The other tradition is the rhetorical-argumentative, which focuses on rhetorical style, justificatory argument and the effects of modes of discourse. These traditions have offered very different insights and, in some areas, complement and reinforce each other.

Keywords: Negotiation, Bargaining, Communication, Rhetoric
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In spite of the numerous reasons to mistrust the statements of adversaries and sometimes even of allies, for millennia, almost certainly longer than recorded history, diplomats and leaders have drawn inferences from conversations about each other’s intentions. They have discussed, codified and reacted, and their reactions have been influenced by the content, form and context of messages from adversaries and friends. The Amarna Letters contain a record of the diplomatic correspondence between Egyptian Pharoahs and the other “Great Kings” of the 14th century B.C.E. Surviving writings from the ancient world contain records of treaties, such as the one concluded by the Egyptian and Hittite Empires around 1259 B.C.E. In the heroic period in ancient Greece, Odysseus was praised for diplomatic skill and words that “fell fast like snowflakes in winter” (Adcock and Mosley 1975, 10). Hundreds of years later, in 412 B.C.E., the Spartans conceded to recognize Persian sovereignty over the Greeks of Asia Minor. The concession seems to have influenced Persia, which supported Sparta against Athens thereafter, resulting in decisive Athenian defeat in less than a decade (Thucydides 1989, Books 8, 37, 58). Similar evidence of important diplomatic exchanges is found in the records of many other ancient cultural realms including the Chinese, Indian and Mayan.

An astounding volume of diplomatic exchange continues today. In 1817, there were fewer than 200 diplomatic missions in foreign countries, while today there are over 8,000 (Bayer 2006). The increasing density of diplomatic representation over the past 200 years can be seen in Figure 1. Whereas in the past it could take months for an ambassador to reach a host country, a Secretary of State, Foreign Minister, Prime Minister or President can now often
reach a counterpart by telephone in moments. High level officials regularly visit each other directly. In negotiating the removal of Soviet nuclear missiles from the Ukraine following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, for instance, U.S. President Clinton made stops first in Brussels, then in Prague, where he met with Central European leaders, and then in Kiev before signing the finished agreement with Russian President Yeltsin and Ukrainian President Kravchuk in Moscow (Talbott 2003, 110-115). With so much industry devoted to diplomatic activity, it is not surprising that histories of modern times, even those that do not set out to analyze diplomatic events, sometimes point to diplomatic exchanges as key moments when perceptions were formed that determined important foreign policy decisions. Consistent with this observation, Trager (2015a, Chapter 2) finds that about half of the inferences drawn in documents by British foreign policy elites in the sixty years between the Crimean and First World wars were the result of diplomatic encounters.

This essay survey’s a broad scope of scholarship on diplomacy, but adopts a relatively narrow definition of the term: speech acts, written or spoken, taken by state representatives to influence events in the international system. While there is no commonly accepted definition, this one is useful in that it distinguishes diplomacy from the management of foreign affairs generally and still encompasses much of the work of scholars who self-identify as focusing on the topic.\(^1\) I identify two approaches to theorizing diplomacy with two perspectives on

\(^1\)There are many other definitions of diplomacy, most of which focus on the representation of states by individuals. Satow (1922, 1), in his famous study of diplomatic practice, defines diplomacy as “the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states.” For a discussion of other definitions, see Sharp (1999) and Sending (2015a, Chapter 1).
how speech influences social dynamics: as a source of information about states of the world and actor preferences; and as rhetoric or argument. Scholars who adopt the information perspective on diplomacy analyze when statements can be believed and how changed beliefs influence behavior. These scholars focus on the content of messages and the incentives of actors to lie or tell the truth in different political contexts. Scholars in the rhetorical tradition study aspects of the style in which content is conveyed and the affective responses that result as well as the ways that modes of discourse socialize actors and constrain what is socially possible. Some scholars adopt more than one of these perspectives and such areas of overlap are often of great interest.

Because scholarship on diplomacy is so extensive and diverse, I focus on political science literatures that aim to understand the effects of diplomatic speech on world security affairs. I do not treat descriptive accounts of the institutions of diplomacy (e.g. Satow 1922) or the changing characters of diplomatic actors (e.g. Bátor and Hynek 2014), critical analyses of diplomatic practice (e.g. Der Derian 1987), or historical narratives of particular diplomatic events. These vast literatures would populate a series of essays on their own. I also focus

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2Within history departments, the turn away from traditional diplomatic history has been pronounced. One point of agreement among divergent 20th century historiographic movements (the Annales School, Marxist history, the histoire s´eriele and others) has been to reject elite focused histories. The great currents of history, these scholars argued, are economic and social. From this perspective, traditional diplomatic history, with its careful reconstructing of specific actions and motivations of elite diplomats, appeared superficial and even immoral. Diplomatic history was superseded by “international history,” which allows scholars to study diplomatic events, but emphasizes the need to do so only while also placing these events in broader social
on works that tie directly into general areas of social scientific theorizing. Thus, I discuss the classic studies of scholar-practitioners (e.g. Nicolson 1963, Kissinger 1994, Nicolson 1954, de Callières 1983) as they relate to the central concerns of the literatures directly addressed in the essay. The next sections describe scholarship from the two perspectives: informational or communicative and rhetorical-argumentative. The former is divided into three subsections: costly signals, costless signals, and inadvertent signals. A final section discusses some of the important questions that remain to be answered.

**Speech as Communication**

Because states are often adversaries or potential adversaries, communicating intentions is difficult. Statements are “signals” that can be manipulated to convey a particular impression as opposed to “indices,” such as a state’s population or resources, which cannot (Jervis 1970). Thus, many statements by diplomats and leaders cannot be taken at face value. Diplomats, who might discuss their state’s plans in conversation, often have incentives to misrepresent the intentions of their state’s leaders. In conversation, simply saying one thing, when one intends another, appears to carry little cost. Thus, Niccolò Machiavelli wrote to an inexperienced diplomat, sent by Florence as ambassador to the court of Charles V, King of Spain and Holy Roman Emperor, “It is very difficult to penetrate the secret of such and economic contexts. While this may appear reasonable and important, the constraint of time means that historians are less able to carefully reconstruct and analyze the complicated strategic calculations in which diplomats regularly engage. Happily, there are historians who do focus on the diplomatic calculus, including Trachtenberg (1999), Gaddis (2006), Elliott (2002), Parker (2000), Schroeder (1996), and Gavin (2004).
conclusions, and it is therefore necessary to depend upon one’s judgment and conjectures. But to find out all the intrigues, and to conjecture the issue correctly, that is indeed difficult, for you have nothing to depend upon except surmises aided by your own judgment” (Berridge 2004, 42).

Leaders that intend aggression against another state, for instance, have incentive to pretend that they do not so that their adversary does not have time to prepare for conflict. François de Callières, the famous French student of diplomacy, argued along these lines in 1716 that a threat should be made just before the blow so that the threatened leader would “not have the time and pretext to guard himself against it by entering into alliances with other princes” (de Callières 1983, 149). Following this advice, diplomatic statements would certainly be misleading, if not strictly dishonest, until a threat was finally made just before the sword fell. Leaders willing to make concessions to avoid conflict also have incentives to hide their intentions from adversaries. Though a leader is willing to concede the issues of the day, she would surely rather not. For this reason, as Fearon (1995) explains with great force and clarity, diplomats sometimes overstate their state’s resolve to resist making a concession. On occasion, leaders even have incentives to hide their intentions from their own allies. Suppose a leader is willing to support an ally in a war against a third state. If the ally were assured of support, it might provoke the third state and thereby precipitate a war. Even when a leader is willing to bring her nation into a war in necessity, she may well also prefer to avoid doing so. For this reason, countries sometimes mistrust the attempts of their own allies to restrain their behavior and assume that their allies will follow them into
conflict.

These incentives to mislead adversaries and even friends have lead some to conclude that only costly signals influence international political actors (Fearon 1995). Building arms and mobilizing forces are costly and therefore signal to adversaries in a way that mere words do not, according to this view. But what constitutes a costly versus a costless signal is sometimes unclear. In the game theoretic literature, signals are considered costly if they carry an inherent cost, one that is paid no matter what else happens in the game. Costless signals can also result in costs being paid by the sender, however, but only as a result of the reactions to those signals in a particular equilibrium. If a signal costs $100 to send, it is a costly signal, but if the signal is free but causes another actor to take $100 from the signaler in a particular equilibrium, it is a costless signal in game-theoretic terms. Literature on diplomacy relates to both types of signals.

**Speech as a Costly Process**

Most responses to the problem of credibility constitute a form of costly signaling. In his classic discussion of “the art of commitment,” Schelling (1966) points out that threatening to launch a nuclear weapon at another state with a secure second strike capability would not be a credible threat. It would be like one climber threatening to throw another off the cliff when the two are roped together. Such attempts at coercion might be expected to fail. Schelling’s answer is that escalatory actions, such as threats, that move both parties closer to the edge, risking that both fall off together, can be credible. States demonstrate their
resolve with respect to the issues at the center of a crisis by incurring the cost of risking a slip in to a conflict that neither side would actually choose. Demonstrating credibility by risking accidental war is called brinkmanship.

Powell (1988) formalizes this logic using a class of costly signaling games known as Rubinstein models. These games of alternating-offers in which bargaining can continue forever until one side accepts the other side’s offer are a common means of modeling speech. The meaningfulness of offers and decisions to accept and decline terms - sometimes called bargaining friction - is the result of a discount factor that causes the value of the goods being negotiated to shrink by a fraction at the end of each round in which no agreement is reached. With so many options available to the actors, one would expect there to be multiple equilibria, but Rubinstein (1982) showed that in fact only one subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists. In the basic setup of these models, all players have the same information and thus the speech that is modeled is not a form of communication; no information is signaled. Extensions of the model discussed below, however, include the possibility of communication.

By adding additional features to the basic Rubinstein model, this giant literature has offered a range of insights. One of the most general is that more patient negotiators have a great advantage over rivals. This can be seen by examining the role of the discount factor in the solution to the basic Rubinstein model, or by examining the literature on “inside options,” the payoff players receive in each round before agreement is reached (Muthoo 1999, Chapter 6). Many of the results in this literature show properties of the equilibrium as the discount factor - the amount that the “pie” shrinks in each round before agreement is
reached - becomes arbitrarily small. This is thought to represent a negotiation in which little time is wasted between offers. One result that holds in this context is that when negotiations can breakdown permanently as a result of an exogenous risk of breakdown or the choice of one of the parties (the latter is known as an “outside option”), player preferences over the breakdown outcome greatly influence the bargaining outcome (Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1986 and Binmore 1985).

Many of these basic extensions to the Rubinstein model still result in a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with no delay in reaching agreement and thus no inefficiency: the goods being negotiated are immediately divided between the two players. But some modifications to the model do result in multiple equilibria and this generally involves the possibility of delay. Two of these modifications are giving players the choice to retract an accepted offer (Muthoo 1990) and giving players the choice to engage in costly conflict that does not terminate the game (Fernandez and Glazer 1991, Slantchev 2003). These added complexities imply a wide range of possible bargaining outcomes, including delay in reaching an agreement and conflict, in contrast to the surprising uniqueness of the original Rubinstein model.

A large literature addresses the consequences of adding private information, such as the subjective value to the players of the goods negotiated, to these models so that signaling may take place in the negotiation. Unique equilibria with interesting comparative statics exist when one player has private information and the other makes offers (Muthoo 1999, Chapter 9), but on the whole, equilibria are not unique when both sides have private information (but see Powell 1996). Among the many equilibria, some exist in which player actions, such as
strategic delay in making “serious” offers, signal information about private valuations to the other player (Cramton 1992). In international relations scholarship, models that adopt the Rubinstein framework include Powell (1988, 2002b, 2004b,a, 2006), Slantchev (2003), and Leventoglu and Tarar (2008).

In all of these models, speech is modeled as a costly process. Declining an offer causes the value of the goods negotiated over to shrink (or risks the breakdown of negotiations or some other related cost). More technically, an offer cannot be “costless” because it limits the options of the other player since only that offer can be accepted or declined in a given round. These models therefore assume that a certain credibility is associated with statements - they inherently influence the true state of the world. Further, since such a wide range of equilibria exist under two sided incomplete information, in this framework, it has proven difficult to convincingly analyze conditions under which statements are credible. Reviews of this literature can be found in Muthoo (1999), Ausubel, Cramton and Deneckere (2002), and Powell (2002a).

Another large body of literature builds on the seminal paper of Fearon (1994a) to model public speech as costly in a different way. Leaders who back down after making a threat may be punished by domestic publics, creating what is known as an audience cost. In the Fearon model, once a crisis has begun, the size of a state’s audience costs, rather than relative power and other factors that are known in advance, predict whether that state is successful in international bargaining once a crisis has begun. When leaders choose to threaten, if they are not in fact willing to follow through on the threat, they take a risk of having to pay an
audience cost. Since only sufficiently resolved leaders would be willing to take such a risk, the public threat conveys information about the leader’s resolve. Fearon (1997) further argues that we should expect public threats to incur maximum levels of audience costs. According to this logic, since a leader would not pay an audience cost if she does not back down, leaders willing to fight should also be willing to make the most explicit threats. While this logic appears compelling, however, it is clear that leaders often do hedge in making demands. How this fact should be incorporated into theories of crisis bargaining remains unclear.

Several empirical studies have examined whether audience costs exist and have the predicted effects. Tomz (2007) finds experimental evidence for the existence of audience costs and further demonstrates that they are larger when force is actually employed than when only a threat is made. Trager and Vavreck (2011) find experimental evidence that audience cost magnitude is large even relative to the electoral costs of an unsuccessful small-scale conflict, increases in the specificity of public threats, and is little influenced by partisan dynamics. Kurizaki and Whang (2014) employ a structural approach to find evidence in observational data that audience costs exist, increase in the level of democracy of the threatening state, and have the predicted effects on crisis behavior. In spite of these positive findings, a wide range of literature questions just how much influence audience costs really have over crisis dynamics (Trachtenberg 2012, Kertzer and Brutger 2015, Snyder and Borghard 2011, Horowitz and Levendusky 2012, Baum 2004, Slantchev 2012, Schultz 2012).

Scholars have also examined how costly public signals interact with domestic processes, making signals more or less credible. Schultz (2001) argues that the opposed incentives of
domestic parties allow foreign governments to learn more from the domestic government’s public statements. For instance, since the opposition party will reveal when a government is bluffing, governments with active oppositions have less ability to bluff, making the threats they do make more credible, all else equal (cf. Levy and Mabe 2004, Levy 2012). Milner (1997) studies related bargaining processes in the context of international economic negotiations. Weeks (2008) argues that not just democracies but most types of autocracies can generate audience costs and finds empirical support for the hypothesis. Weiss (2013) argues that in autocracies, popular movements related to crisis outcomes raise the stakes for the regime, and therefore the decision to tolerate popular movements is itself part of the signaling component of autocratic audience costs.

There is a large literature on alliances that often treats them as costly signals, both among alliance members and to third parties. Scholars often link the credibility of alliances to the domestic or international reputational costs that backing down from the public commitment would entail (Leeds 1999, Morrow 2000). Speech in its written form is viewed as all the more explicit and thus consequential for a state’s domestic or international reputations when commitments are abrogated. The forming of an alliance is also itself sometimes thought of as explicitly costly and thus informative as a “sunk cost” signal (Smith 1998a, Morrow 1994, Smith 1995). Other scholars see the terms of alliances as facilitating coordination through the harmonization of military planning, thereby reducing transaction costs in the event of conflict and influencing adversary calculations about the likelihood that the alliance states would fight together (Morrow 1994, Smith 1998a). The credibility of alliance commitments
have been examined in a broad empirical literature (e.g. Huth and Russett 1984, Snyder 1997, and Leeds 2003). The mechanisms of alliance credibility have also been examined in the context of differing regime types (Gaubatz 1996, Leeds 1999).

Other scholars assume that alliance signals can be credible and take up the interesting questions of what sorts of signals will be chosen and what effects different sorts of signals will have. Snyder (1997) addresses the problem of committing to defend an ally under certain conditions without also emboldening the ally to take undesired, risky actions that may result in an unwanted conflict. Benson (2012, Chapter 5) analyzes the levels of alliance commitments that would be chosen in such contexts. Leeds (2003) examines the differing effects of commitments to defense, neutrality and aggression. She finds that all have the expected effects on the behavior of committing states and the states that might choose to attack them.

Most scholars agree that the formation of alliances are consequential events that influence subsequent international history (cf. Mearsheimer 1994, Kydd 2005, Chapter 7, Kydd 1997), but the effects of alliances and the mechanisms through which they operate are still subjects of debate. For instance, some studies argue that particular classes of alliances make war more likely (Smith 1996). Colaresi and Thompson (2005) find that alliances that are formed in the context of an enduring rivalry between one of the states and a third state make war more likely, while other alliances make war less likely. By contrast, Gibler 2000 argues that

all alliances between major powers increase in the likelihood of war. Maoz (2000) finds that 19th century alliances precipitate violence while 20th century alliances do not. Other studies associate conflict with alliance formation when the states can be classified as dissatisfied or were involved in a recent war (Gibler 2000, Leeds 2003, Gibler and Vasquez 1998), or when the alliance makes the balance of power more unequal (Siverson and Tennefoss 1984), or was formed for a compellent purpose (Benson 2011). It remains for the field to parse out which of these findings correspond to underlying causal logics and which are merely associated them. Fortna (2003, 2004) argues that peace agreements that contain provisions that raise the cost of non-compliance (for instance through creating demilitarized zones) and help to regulate responses to disputes increase the likelihood that the peace holds.4

Costless Signals

Other areas of scholarship focus on understanding how and when speech that is not inherently costly can communicate information and influence events. These scholars are the most likely to self-identify as working in the area of “diplomacy” and many are focused on the dynamics of conversations that occur away from public view. These scholars also sometimes take the view, however, that models of costly signaling are useful simplifications of fundamentally costless processes. In audience cost models, for instance, backing down from a public statement has a cost, but this is an assumption that stands in for the reaction

4On the structure of agreements, see also Rosendorff (2005), Koremenos (2005) and Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001).
of observers to an act that has little cost in itself. More complicated costless models can generate audience cost dynamics as an equilibrium property (Sartori 2005, 58, Smith 1998b, Ramsay 2004). Costly public signaling also has drawbacks: it may make it harder for an adversary to make a concession because of the appearance of backing down in the face of a threat, and engaging in a public contest can raise the risks of actual conflict. These create rationales for private signaling that many associate with costless processes (Kurizaki 2007, Leventoglu and Tarar 2005, Tarar and Leventoglu 2009).

Formal work on costless signals follows in the tradition begun in the seminal paper by Crawford and Sobel (1982). They showed that communication is more precise between actors whose preferences are more closely aligned. For actors with identical preferences, there is no interesting strategic problem in communicating. Understanding whether actor preferences are similar enough to allow for communication between adversaries, however, is often difficult. Both formal and informal analyses of the mechanisms of diplomatic signaling have therefore primarily focused on how adversaries, who have incentives to mislead, still manage to communicate information about their intentions. An early paper, whose title “Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining” (Farrell and Gibbons 1989) conveyed the authors’ surprise at the result, demonstrated that cheap talk might indeed be important even in highly adversarial contexts. Ramsay (2011) applies this model to international affairs.

Many scholars have focused on how a concern to maintain a bargaining reputation enables private diplomatic signaling (e.g. Schelling 1966, 51-55, Jervis 1970, Dafoe, Renshon and Huth 2014). Since diplomats and leaders interact repeatedly over time, sending a signal
that is demonstrated to have been false may mean that the signaler is not believed in the future. As Sartori (2005) explains in the clearest terms, when diplomats do not have a reputation for honesty, their states will more often have to fight to get their way. As a result, there are substantial drawbacks to losing one’s reputation for sending honest signals. Many scholars of diplomatic conduct, over the centuries, have recommended a truthful approach to negotiation for this reason. Cardinal Richelieu, for instance, believed that a “good reputation is so important to a great prince that no possible gain could compensate for its loss, which would be the result if he failed to hold to his pledged word.” (du Plessis 1961, 101) Another practitioner and scholar of diplomacy, Harold Nicolson, believed that at one time, “a corporate estimate of character,” was maintained by professional diplomats on a “Stock Market of diplomatic reputation” (Nicolson 1963, 40). François de Callières was another of those scholars who believed diplomats should never say anything that is strictly untrue (de Callières 1983), which is in contrast to Louis XI of France who is meant to have told his ambassadors, “If they lie to you, lie still more to them.” Thus, while many international relations scholars view reputation as attaching to states, scholars and practitioners of diplomacy often see reputation as attaching to individual diplomats.

In the international relations literature, the first formal costless signaling model was developed by Sartori (2002, 2005). She showed in a repeated interaction context that equilibria exist in which costless state signals are more credible when states have not been caught bluffing in the past, and therefore statements of resolve convey information to rivals. The disincentive to send a misleading signal comes from the value of being believed in the future.
The ability to send a credible signal means a state can achieve the foreign policy goals it considers most important with less chance of having to fight for to do so. States are loath to bluff as a result, but still sometimes do so when an issue is sufficiently important to be worth the risk of being caught in a bluff, but not important enough to fight over. An interesting implication of the model is that states are willing to fight over a broader range of issues when they have not been caught bluffing in the past and therefore have a reputation to defend. This means that diplomacy can either increase or decrease the incidence of war, depending on which of two effects win out: the dampening effect of being able to signal what a state would be willing to fight over an issue and the exacerbating effect of the incentive to fight to maintain reputation. For a wide range of parameters, the latter effect wins out and presence of this form of diplomatic signaling increases the probability of war.

Another interesting property of the model is that states develop an apparent reputation from period to period without that corresponding to anything about the state that is unchanging across periods. When a state is caught in a bluff, nothing about the state’s fundamental preferences to fight or send honest signals in subsequent periods has been learned. Rather, the subjective value of the contested issue in a round of the game is drawn anew from a distribution in each period. So even though the model is not one in which cheap talk allows for learning about characteristics of the actors that persist across periods, reputational dynamics emerge endogenously from equilibrium behavior. The infinite horizon and cheap talk aspects of the game both suggest that many equilibria would be possible and that is indeed the case. As in all cheap talk models, a “babbling” equilibrium exists in which actors
do not pay attention to signals and therefore there is also no incentive to send accurate ones. The signaling equilibrium also depends on specific shared expectations and understandings. For instance, in the equilibrium, when a reputation for honesty is lost, it returns naturally over time. If, instead, convincing other actors to view threats as credible following a bluff requires following through on a threat, the signaling equilibrium does not exist (Kagotani and Trager 2008).5

Many other mechanisms for how private diplomatic encounters can inform adversaries have now been described in the literature. Schelling (1966) addressed the ways in which the framing of a dispute in conversation could signal resolve. For instance, by convincing an adversary that a state’s leaders think the adversary is violating the status quo in their relations, a state might also convince the adversary of the state’s determination to resist whatever the adversary is doing. According to Jervis (1970), leaders may be reticent to lie for moral reasons, causing a measure of credibility to attach to their statements. Or, if a country has a stake in the current functioning of the international system, a reticence to lie may derive from a desire to ensure that states do not too often deceive each other since a baseline of honest communication may be required to maintain the overall systemic equilibrium. Yet another proposed mechanism of diplomatic exchange relates to the potential for discovered lies to result in unwanted “changes in the international environment.” Sometimes,

5Guisinger and Smith (2002) combine the audience cost and costless signaling strains of literature to show that, in the presence of a reputational mechanism along the lines of Sartori’s, democratic selection of leaders results in an endogenous additional disincentive against bluffing.
if a statement is believed, other actors may act in such a way that the actor making the statement has an additional incentive to follow through on the statement. For instance, if one state professes hostility towards another, the reaction of the second state may make it in the first state’s interest to take hostile actions it had not originally planned on taking. Kurizaki (2007) shows that when a publicly threatened state will lose face by backing down, it may be optimal for states to make private threats. Such threats do not increase the probability the threatened state assigns to the threatener following through, but neither do these private threats - and the decision not to issue a public demand - cause that probability to go to zero either (cf. Fearon 1997, 84).

Very often, when states negotiate over important security concerns, there is a danger that a threat, or some other action contrary to the interests of one’s negotiating partner, will result in a breach in relations, not merely with respect to the issue at hand, but also with respect to other aspects of the relationship. Trager (2010) argues that information is therefore conveyed by threats because states understand the dangers of altering other states’ perceptions of their intentions, and yet choose to threaten anyway when they are sufficiently resolved. Put differently, if foreign policy choices are responsive to perceptions of other states’ intentions, then explicit threats from one state to another, whether in public or private, can convey information.

Signaling intention in this way is not always possible, however, and sometimes is not even desirable. If an adversary is too likely to refuse a demand and make preparations for war, then states are better served to hide any aggressive intentions, decline to issue demands, and
when the time comes, attack with little or no warning. If an adversary is thought too likely
to comply with a demand, however, signaling is impossible because there will be too much
incentive to make a threat, even if the threatening state is not willing to follow through with
any punishment in the event the demand is refused. Thus, informative diplomacy occurs
when these incentives to understate and overstate seriousness of purpose are in relative
balance.

Trager (2013) argues against the contention that the scope of a costless demand does not
convey information in a rationalist bargaining context (Fearon 1995). When a state makes
a large demand of another state, the demanding state often lowers its chances of achieving
a somewhat less favorable settlement without having to fight for it. Thus, when states
make larger demands, they run a risk, and since states would not be willing to run this risk
unless a large concession (rather than an intermediate compromise) were of sufficient value to
them, these threats convey information. One result is that when one side believes the other
is sufficiently unlikely to make a full concession, then demanding a full concession allows
the other side to be certain that the demanding state will fight unless such a concession is
offered. Trager (2011) studies a related dynamic in which diplomats can convince each other
of their resolve on one set of issues by admitting their lack of resolve on another set of issues.
These models imply interesting and sometimes counterintuitive effects of diplomacy on the
probably of conflict. For instance, increases in the probability that one side is resolved to

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This dynamic requires that both sides share in any gains from avoiding conflict, something which does
not happen in an ultimatum game context with a fully divisible issue space.
fight over one set of issues can decrease the probability of conflict because the expectation of higher resolve also makes more precise diplomatic signaling possible.

The specific topic of deterrence, which overlaps with diplomacy but also includes analysis of the direct influence of power and other factors, is associated with a gigantic literature, some of which was discussed above. (For reviews see Huth 1999 and Benson 2012.) Within this literature, the topic of “extended deterrence” - when states commit to defend territories outside their own borders - is itself a substantial literature. This type of coercion can be thought of as a costly or costless process. Many factors that contribute to deterrence success have been analyzed theoretically and empirically, and Fearon (1994b) finds only mixed evidence that threats make Targets more likely to back down. Huth and Russett (1984) and Huth (1988a) show that local military strength is associated with coercive success. Huth (1988b) and Huth (1988a) analyze the influence of actions in previous crises. Werner (2000) examines the impact of the scope of coercive demands, Danilovic (2002) shows that success is associated with a measure of geopolitical stake in the region, and Russett (1963) and Crawford (2003) examine a variety of these factors alongside others. Fortna (2003, 2004) provides evidence that third party guarantees in peace agreements dramatically reduce the likelihood that conflict recurs. The complexity of strategic interactions implies that correctly specifying econometric models is difficult, however, meaning that the true determinants of coercive success are difficult to determine (Signorino 1999, Signorino and Tarar 2006, Lewis and Schultz (2003)). This is equally true of military threats and those involving economic sanctions (Baldwin 1985, Bapat and Kwon 2015, Whang, McLean and Kuberski
Some studies argue that signaling considerations are not important determinants of successful deterrence, relative to material factors, while others argue the opposite. Huth and Russett (1984) and Danilovic (2002) find that deterrence is successful when the “defender” has a strong interest in the survival and advancement of the “protégé”; it is power and interest that matter, not the signals sent. Trager (2015b) argues that a degree of harmony of interest between such states facilitates coercive success vis-à-vis a third state, but largely because this enables informative signaling. On this account, uncertainty about whether a defender would join a potential conflict often remains even when interests appear aligned (Gartner and Siverson 1996, Smith 1996), and it is this uncertainty that costless, diplomatic signals can remove when the defender has a sufficient interest in the protégé. The logic of the costless signaling mechanism stems from the fact that commitments made by a defender to a protégé may embolden the protégé. As a result, the protégé may take actions that make a conflict more likely, in which case the defender will be forced to intervene to support the protégé if the defender is indeed willing to do so. As long as the defender and protégé’s interests are sufficiently aligned, therefore, the defender would not wish to offer support to the protégé unless the the defender were sufficiently resolved to follow through. The result is that the defender’s statements of support can convey information to the defender and protégé’s adversaries. In fact, adversaries need not even observe the defender’s statements; they can infer whether or not the defender offered its support in private from the public bargaining behavior of the protégé. The analysis provides an alternate perspective on the

Scholarship on “mediation” - when a third party attempts to reconcile opposing interests to prevent conflict - is closely related to this literature. The early literature on costless mediation focused on whether the presence of a mediator expanded the set of equilibrium outcomes beyond what would be possible without a mediator. The answer is yes for games of less than four players (Forges 1990). In this literature, the mediator receives private messages from the players and then provides a set of private messages back. This is equivalent to the technical solution concept known as “correlated equilibrium” (Aumann 1987) and it turns out that an equilibrium of a game with any sort of costless communication, no matter how complex, must also be a correlated equilibrium (Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin 1979, Myerson 1979, 1986). Thus, communication can be modeled in a simple way, through the solution concept, instead of through specific game protocols (Myerson 1991, Chapter 6).

A fictional mediator therefore allows for a general analysis of what communication can achieve in rationalist games, but international relations scholars have not found this to be a productive way to model the results of actual mediation. The reason is that real mediators always have their own interests. One might ask what could be achieved if the mediator
ignored these, but this question is firmly in the realm of the hypothetical. Even a mediator that cared only about ending or avoiding conflict would be different from the mediators considered in this literature. When the underlying source of tension derives from bargaining over a set of contested goods, mediators that wish only to see conflict avoided have the same incentives to misrepresent the preferences of states that the states themselves have. Thus, even if a mediator were able to learn the private information of one side about what it was willing to fight for, the mediator’s report would not be trusted by the other side. This occurs because the mediator cannot commit to a course of action it will have no reason to follow. This incentive problem can be overcome if the mediator is not impartial but biased towards one side. Then, at least that side will believe “bad news” about the high level of resolve of the other party (Kydd 2003). Other scholars, however, argue that biased mediators are less effective (Smith and Stam 2003, Rauchhaus 2006). Favretto (2009) finds that a large bias leads to peace because third party intervention is certain, and a complete lack of bias does also because the third party acts as an honest broker. Only in the middle range of the degree of bias towards one side is mediation likely to fail. Kydd (2006) uses a costless signaling model to argue that when the underlying source of conflict is mistrust - whether the other side truly wants peace - rather than bargaining, unbiased mediators are in fact more effective. Thus, the effectiveness of mediators and the mediator best suited to the task may depend on the situation and in particular on the principal drivers of the conflict. Beardsley (2011), on the other hand, shows that there is reason to question whether mediation is effective at all over the long run. Rather, mediators may successfully create fragile peaces that are more
likely to devolve into conflict than unmediated peaces after about five years. Other scholars analyze particular techniques of third party intervention (Dixon 1996, Bercovitch and Rubin 1992) and consider cases when parties to disputes strategically decide whether to appeal to a third party (Chapman and Wolford 2010). For a review of rationalist approaches to third party intervention, see Kydd (2010).

Scholars have also examined state mediation in the context of ethnic rivalries. There is evidence that attempts to intervene to prevent ethnic conflict within a state can in fact encourage the very outcomes these interventions are designed to prevent. Scholars continue to debate whether this results from the emboldening effect on ethnic minorities within states or the incentive to create a *fait accomplis* before outside intervention occurs, as well as what sorts of mediation by what sorts of international actors can be effective in varied contexts (Cetinyan 2002, Kuperman 2008, Grigoryan 2010, Kydd and Straus 2013).

Costless signaling models analyze the credibility and impact on events of particular statements by state actors. Arguably, these models have an advantage over the Rubinstein framework in that they ask when statements influence events rather than assuming that statements always do, at least through discounting.\(^7\) But this benefit comes at a cost of simplification of the negotiating process. One might wonder whether the process were important and even suspect that in a game theoretic context whatever could be conveyed by an actor in equi-

\(^7\)Though scholars employing Rubinstein models often study the case where the discount factor has almost no effect (in the limit as the discount factor goes to one), the discount factor nevertheless drives the results of the model. When players have different discount factors, this is particularly clear: even though they are arbitrarily close to zero, a lower discount factor still produces substantial gains in the bargaining outcome.
librium could be conveyed in a single statement rather than over the course of a process of interaction. Aumann and Hart (2003) show, however, that this is not so. Even in costless signaling contexts, one actor may not have incentive to reveal certain information until another actor has revealed certain information. Simplification of the process down to a set of statements, therefore, may not be harmless assumption. This suggests that further investigating longer processes of cheap talk signaling may be fruitful, and perhaps particularly so in the context of international mediation.

Another topic that bears further study is the dynamics of promises and assurances. While this overlaps with the literature on alliances and agreements discussed above, the conditions under which promises are self-fulfilling is a topic in its own right. Although some reassurances must be costly to build trust, as Kydd (2005, Chapter 7) argues, the volume of private reassurances discussed in the diplomatic historical record suggests they may have some purpose. Perhaps when breaking a promise is likely enough to be discovered in an infinite horizon game context and the benefits of breaking the promise accrue only slowly, a commitment to cooperate may not require a cost to convince. Trager (2015a, Chapter 6) studies a mechanism whereby diplomatic approaches signal a desire to establish better relations because the actions the approached state will take as a result represent a concession by the approaching state. In some circumstances, however, states observing the two draw together will draw the ominous inferences that the approaching state is either hostile towards or fearful of a particular third state, or wishes to create distance in the relationship of the approached state and some third state. The dynamics of promises have
been somewhat more studied in the contexts of international aid flows (De Mesquita and Smith 2007, Milner and Tingley 2013), bargaining prior to United Nations voting (Carter and Stone 2015, Kuziemko and Werker 2006, Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland 2009, Voeten 2004), and multilateral interventions following civil wars (Doyle and Sambanis 2006).

**Inadvertent Signals**

Models of signaling often assume that in equilibrium, signals are interpreted correctly. A signal might not be credible, but the receiver would not confuse one signal with another and the sender would in general not mistake how the signal would be interpreted. In practice, signals are often misinterpreted (Jervis 1976). The need for cognitive consistency, the disproportionate weighting of recent events, the uses and misuses of historical analogy (Khong 1992), the tendency to see the roots of one’s own action in the situation and the roots of other’s actions in their dispositions, and the need to avoid cognitive dissonance all lead to poor inferences (e.g. Jervis 1976, Larson 1994, Larson 2000, Kahneman and Renshon 2007). The literature on perceptual biases is far too large to adequately summarize here, but for analysis of some of the subtle debates, see Gerber and Green (1999), and for a readable account of the field by a leading psychologist, see Kahneman (2011). Note, however, that some apparent psychological biases can also be explained in rationalist terms (e.g. Kydd 1997, Kydd 2005).

Actors also send inadvertent signals through physiological responses to contexts. Holmes (2013) argues that actors naturally simulate each other’s mental states from facial and body
cues. This implies that information can be learned from face-to-face diplomacy that would not otherwise be available. The science in this area is “still in its infancy,” however (Holmes 2013, 850). Actors are often deceived, face-to-face meetings trigger biases that may overwhelm the positive signals, and information gleaned from physiology may be hard to communicate within the foreign policy bureaucracy, leading it to have less influence on state policies. Even if some responses to physiological signals are pre-cognitive and not prone to error, this data still requires interpretation to give it international political meaning, leading to another source of signaling “noise.” Nevertheless, impressions derived from face-to-face meetings may at times be decisive in state considerations, and these questions represent an area of substantial, continuing interest.

The actions of actors in the international system also serve to construct the international environment of states. Rules are reified and actors socialized. The future form that anarchy takes is influenced by individual level decisions, including diplomatic ones, perhaps particularly those that are taken in public (Wendt 1999). While some scholars locate the construction of identity primarily at the domestic level (e.g. Fanis 2011), others see identities forming through processes of interstate relations (e.g. Davis Cross 2007, Risse 2010, Checkel and Katzenstein 2009). The most prominent among these analyses do not specifically theorize the role of speech, and therefore are not treated in depth here. Nevertheless, diplomatic interactions are treated as part and parcel of international social processes. For reviews of this literature, see FinneMORE and Sikkink (2001) and Adler (2012). In an account that confirms the role of actors in constructing a diplomatic culture, the scholar-practitioner, Harold
Nicolson (1954), gives a historical narrative of the evolution of diplomatic practice from the quickly changing “combinazioni” of the “Italian System” of the 16th century to the more stable “French System” and then into two modern forms. Leeds and Davis (1997)’s analysis of 19th and 20th century alliances also confirms the existence of such fundamental evolutions in diplomatic practice. While nearly 40% of alliances signed between the Napoleonic and First World Wars contained an offensive provision directed against a third state, for example, only 13% of those signed during the Cold War contained such a provision and no alliance did in the period from the end of the Cold War through 2003 (Leeds and Mattes 2007, 191). Scholars have analyzed changed diplomatic processes (Sending 2015a) and institutional sources of stability (Bátora and Hynek 2014), but the influence of specific diplomatic acts on future diplomatic cultures and institutions has been less theorized.

**Speech as Rhetoric and Argumentation**

Formal models of speech do not capture the give and take of reasoned argument or the influence of rhetorical style. In costless signaling models, there is no inherent meaning to signals. If an equilibrium exists in which the speech acts “threaten” and “don’t threaten” convey information, an equilibrium also exists in which “I like ice cream” and “I don’t like ice cream” convey the same information. Further, in equilibrium, only a few messages (e.g. “I will concede on this issue but not on that one”) tend to be sent. This is either the result of an assumption about the range of messages that can be sent or a property of the equilibrium resulting from an assumption about the domain of uncertainty. There are theoretical analyses...
of how symbols with given meanings might be included in game theoretic models, but these are not yet part of the body of applied work (Demichelis and Weibull 2008).

Scholars have theorized the effects of the richer real domain of diplomatic exchange. On some accounts, important effects stem from the content of arguments. On others, the focus of analysis is on style rather than content or on the effects of discoursing together in particular modes. These topics overlap with communicative aspects of diplomacy, but are not limited to that aspect. Affective response, the evolution of views (rather than knowledge of “known unknowns”) and the constraints of norms of argument are often viewed as at least as important.

Much of what diplomats do consists in the giving of justificatory reasons for actions they plan to take or wish others to believe they will take in certain contingencies (e.g. Stein 2000, Mitzen 2005, Goddard 2009). When reasons are given in public, the audience may be a domestic public a leader wishes to mobilize or a foreign public or elite group that a leader wishes to placate. Justifications offered in private may also convince foreign elites to refrain from balancing against aggression or even convince a foreign state to join in common action. Thus, Bismarck was able to mitigate the balancing response to Germany’s rise through justifying rhetoric that suggested Germany had only limited aims (Goddard 2009), and even Hitler’s justifications of each act of aggression blunted the British response in the 1930s (Goddard 2015). The justificatory reasons that resonate vary. While Bismarck, in exchanges with Russia, framed his actions as a bar to the democratic revolutionary ideas emanating from France, today’s justifications would more likely appeal, for example, to international
law (Hurd 2015) or humanitarian norms (Sending 2015b). These justificatory arguments may decisively influence politics on the world stage, but perhaps this does not follow from the fact that justificatory arguments are ubiquitous in diplomatic encounters. It may be, for instance, that a social sanction would result if a state did not offer any justification, but the quality of justifications is not closely scrutinized by foreign policy elites. This would be consistent with the finding in Trager (2015a, Chapter 2) that members of the British Foreign Office frequently drew inferences about a state’s likely future behavior from the fact that a state was offering a justification for its declared intention, but rarely drew inferences from the content or quality of those arguments.

The act of discussing together in the mode of diplomatic exchange may itself influence habits, understandings and preferences. Risse (2000, 22) argues that diplomatic practice has a “civilizing effect” because “justifying selfish interests on the basis of egoistical reasons is nearly impossible in the public sphere.” Appealing to reasons that apply more generally is habit forming. Both Risse and Mitzen (2005) are concerned with the preconditions for public reason in the diplomatic sphere and find these in the Habermasian concept of a common cultural “life world” (which in turn draws on the Wittgensteinian precondition for any communication, a common “form of life”). The common life world provides the source for argument that transcends self-interest. In spite of the differences between international

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8Sending (2015b) is also concerned to distinguish the authority claiming of diplomats and humanitarians. The former participate in a thin culture in part designed to facilitate exchange across cultural differences while humanitarians participate in a thicker, universalizing, rights culture. On diplomatic culture and the ways it facilitates compromise and therefore peace, see also Sharp (2009).
actors, common purposes such as maintaining diplomatic institutions and the balance of power, and common respect for international law and other norms, which have developed over time, provide this basis for public reason in international relations. Both scholars see the possibility that actors are convinced by argument as an important driver of events (see also Checkel 2001 and Johnston 2001) - for instance, “Western policymakers, particularly the United States and Germany... convinced Gorbachev to agree to German unification within NATO” (Risse 2000, 23). But just the act of attempting to appear impartial and fair in order to convince in the public space creates “commitments based on those rationales.” Thus, “what Elster calls the ‘civilizing force of hypocrisy’ can thus lead to more equitable group outcomes than if powerful actors did not have to justify their actions in public.” (Mitzen 2005, 411) Over time, what de Calli`ers called a “freemasonry of diplomacy” may develop and, in addition, the impartial arguments that may have been advanced cynically may acquire normative force.

Krebs and Jackson (2007) see rhetorical framing of arguments as an important determinant of outcomes, but not through the mechanism of persuasion. Nevertheless, their focus is on rhetoric and not on costless signaling, which they rightly note, “flattens rhetoric into a purely informational tool [that] cannot shed light on the framing competitions that often lie at the heart of politics” (Krebs and Jackson 2007, 38). They argue instead that “framing contests” are common means through which choices made in argument influence outcomes. Such contests rely on the density of the cultural links between actors, which play a role similar to the “life world” in other conceptions, providing standards for the “acceptable” in
argument and thus allowing actors to skillfully close off means of rebuttal through rhetorical choices. This view can be contrasted to one in which public framings rouse public sentiment and may thereby, for instance, convey bargaining leverage and constrain actors, perhaps making compromise impossible (Goddard 2006).

Other scholars focus on the affective response to rhetoric rather than on argumentative fencing. While the Austrian threats to Russia during the Crimean War may have conveyed information, for instance, the Russian response was also emotional. In the years that followed, Bismarck characterized this response in a letter to his wife when he was Prussian ambassador to St. Petersburg: “No mangy dog takes a bit of meat from [the Austrians] . . . the hate is without measure and exceeds all my expectations” (Mosse 1958, 84). It is likely that this reaction influenced the Russian break with Austria and decisive support for Prussian actions that lead to German unification. Such negative reactions to diplomatic encounters can influence policies, and the trajectory of world history, for many years (Trager 2012). In a similar vein, there is a literature on whether and when demands are provocative, and thereby frustrate their objectives (Jervis 1976, Chapter 3, Lebow and Stein 1989, Stein 1991, 433, Jervis 1989). Threats may provoke for many reasons, including that they confirm negative images about the threatening state that already exist in the target state. But the form of a demand may matter as well in that it influences the affective response. Framings that are humiliating or appear to deny to “voice” to threatened states, for instance, may make it harder for threatened states to back down (Jervis 1976, 101, Kurizaki 2007, Barnhart 2015, Gottfried and Trager 2015). The affective response to diplomacy is also implicated in
the scholarship on honor dynamics, and here signaling and affective response reinforce each other since the willingness to risk insulting honor conveys information about resolve (O’Neill 1999, Nisbett and Cohen 1996). This may be a reason mediation is useful - the mediator can facilitate negotiation without engaging the parties’ honor (O’Neill 2003). Lind (2011) shows that the affective response to apologies can improve bilateral relations following conflicts by reducing the perception of threat, but apologizing can also backfire: it may trigger a domestic backlash, thereby actually heightening the perception that the state represents a threat.

Some generalizations may apply to leaders and diplomats generally, but classifying leaders into types may provide significant insight into understanding how these types conduct diplomatic affairs. In this vein, Rathbun, Kertzer and Paradis (2015) attempt to reconcile debates between liberals and realists by associating each strategic rationality with “psychological microfoundations” that apply to different individuals. Similarly, Rathbun (2014) argues that political liberals and conservatives adopt systematically different foreign policies. This area of research jibes with a recent scholarly focus on leadership attributes as an explanatory variable in the study of international politics (Chiozza and Goemans 2004, Chiozza and Goemans 2011, Horowitz and Stam 2014).

Much of the conflict resolution and mediation literature deals with how face-to-face meetings can influence affective responses. Overcoming “we-they” images and altering deeply held enmities is central. One recommendation from the literature is to build peace not from the top down, but through peace plans in which the parties are invested. Another is to al-
low political leaders to engage each other in secret so that talking itself does not become a political issue before progress towards peace is made. A broad sample of the literature can be found in Crocker, Hampson and Aall (1999) and see also, for instance, Zartman (1989). This literature tends to be qualitative and in many cases deeply informed by practitioner experience. In many instances, however, the theories advanced do not engage with the broader conceptual models of conflict and communication employed by political scientists (but see Long and Brecke 2003).

**Conclusion**

Much remains to be understood about diplomatic processes. Some problems are well-known, but persistent. When will threats deter and when will they precipitate spirals of conflict (Jervis 1976)? When will actors who have been caught in a bluff be more aggressive (Jervis 1997, 255-58, 266-71) and when less (Sartori 2002)? How will signals be interpreted and when will they be misunderstood? What factors determine affective responses in publics and in elites to the statements of leaders and diplomats and how do these responses structure what is politically possible? With the rise of experimental political science, a new tool will facilitate new answers to some of these questions.

A substantial portion of the literature on diplomatic communication has focused on understanding how communication happens when one side is attempting to coerce another because communication is thought to be most difficult in such contexts. But much information is exchanged in diplomatic discussions when neither neither side is attempting to
convince the other of a commitment to a course of action. Such exchanges are frequent because, for hundreds of years, diplomats have been provided with information about their states’ plans, not just in the area of the world where the diplomat is posted, but more broadly. The reason for this practice, according to Machiavelli, is that “he who wants another to tell him all he knows must in return tell the other some things that he knows, for the best means of obtaining information from others is to communicate some information to them. And therefore if a republic desires that her ambassador shall be honored, they cannot do a better thing than to keep him amply supplied with information; for the men who know that they can draw information from him will hasten to tell him all they know” (Berridge 2004, 42). These processes of exchange, and the general questions associated with non-adversarial diplomacy, have been less theorized by scholars.

Scholars have analyzed public and private signals, but the question of when the one is an optimal strategy and when the other has not been addressed in the context of the range of signaling possibilities that exist in both contexts. Are the processes of conference diplomacy conducted behind closed doors closer to public or private signaling? The formal literature, taken as a whole, offers a set of nuanced considerations and determinants of when private signals will be credible, but little overall evaluation of such larger questions. Quantitative data to adjudicate between competing arguments about the dynamics of private diplomacy is still in short supply, but this is likely to change as computer methods of textual analysis continue to develop.

How do evolving technologies influence diplomatic process and the international system?
More than sixty years ago, Nicolson (1954, 111) noted that “today a Foreign Secretary from his desk in Downing Street can telephone to six ambassadors in the course of one morning or can even descend upon them quite suddenly from the sky.” This is a far cry from Stratford Canning, British Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, who as a law unto himself exceeding his instructions played such a significant role in precipitating the Crimean War. The most consequential moments of diplomacy may have shifted further up government hierarchies as the profession evolves in a variety of ways (Sharp 1997, Cooper 1997), with potential implications for democratic accountability, as well as for negotiations and their outcomes.

The path from individual statements to social facts that are taken for granted is only partly charted. The place of speech acts vis-à-vis actions that directly influence the material world is not established. Is international society created through interactions at the international level, or do moral codes that strongly influence behavior evolve and primarily apply to agents interacting within the borders of states? Processes of negotiation between state representatives inform about what states are willing to fight for and what issues they consider less important. How are these expectations refracted through bureaucracies, how do they come to influence intersubjective understandings among the powers of the day, and what are the results on processes of war and peace? In forming peace settlements after major wars, for instance, the processes of negotiation, perhaps more than the documents these negotiations produce, may form the mutual expectations that are the bases of new international orders (Trachtenberg 2008, 128, Trachtenberg 1999, Ikenberry 2008). These are just a few among the many interesting directions for future scholarship.
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**Figure 1. Diplomatic Representation from 1817 to 2005**

Source: Correlates of War Diplomatic Exchange Data Set, Version 2006.1 by Reşat Bayer. Note that the data up to 1980 is not comparable to the data after 1980 because the former counts multiple entries for single diplomatic representatives accredited to multiple countries, whereas the latter does not.