Concessions for Concessions Sake: Injustice, Indignation and the Construction of Intractable Conflict in Israel-Palestine

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In intractable conflicts, where issues appear indivisible, what factors lead populations to accept negotiated outcomes? We show that population preferences are determined in important respects by affective responses to the conflict process rather than by exogenous material factors. The framing of the conflict by political elites determines the legitimacy of a proposed settlement. In particular, when there is a perception of past injustice committed by a negotiating adversary, populations respond to cues that suggest that the scales of justice have been balanced. To examine these issues, we conduct a survey experiment on a representative sample of the Jewish Israeli population and a companion experiment on a representative sample of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. We find that holding the negotiated settlement outcome constant, approval of the settlement is strongly influenced by whether it is framed as a negotiating defeat for the Israeli or the Palestinian side if and only if respondents are primed to be indignant, and that these effects are strongly mediated by perceptions of the fairness of the settlement outcome. Moral indignation produces a desire for concessions for concession’s sake. Thus, the acceptance of a political settlement depends not only on its concrete details, but in large part on the political cues that frame judgments of fairness. Such conflicts over political framing violate fundamental assumptions of the rationalist literature on conflict processes.

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The persistence of some conflicts is mysterious. Long-running conflicts often seem to center on issues of control of material resources that can be divided. Israel and the Palestinian Authority contest control of territory and religious sites and closely related questions of Palestinian institutionalization and empowerment. India and Pakistan have had difficulty agreeing on a division of control in Kashmir. Often, the issues negotiated do not significantly influence the balance of power. Over time, uncertainties about capabilities and levels of resolve would seem to be clarified. What then prevents adversaries from reaching compromises? Why are some issues fought over, sometimes for generations, where other potential conflicts over similar sorts of issues are quickly resolved?

In enduring conflicts, particularly when considerations of fairness and honor are involved, participants tend to be highly emotionally engaged. Understanding the determinants of the affective response to compromise, therefore, is likely key to understanding the development of political preferences over settlement outcomes. We find that these determinants go well beyond the facts of the agreement itself.

Following a substantial literature in psychology, we show that judgments of fairness are principal mediators of affective response to a proposed dispute settlement. When there is a perception of an unfair or illegitimate past act committed by a negotiating adversary, populations will respond to cues that suggest that the scales of justice have been balanced. Indignation triggered by an adversary’s past actions thus transforms the psychology of negotiations. The perception of past injustice makes populations seek settlements that appear as impositions on the other side, even in the absence of any material or substantive incentives for doing so.

To examine these issues, we conducted a survey experiment on a representative sample of the Jewish-Israeli population. Holding the negotiated settlement outcome constant, approval of the settlement is strongly influenced by whether it is framed as a negotiating defeat for the Israeli or the Palestinian side. This effect is conditional, however, on whether we induce indignation. We show through mediation analysis that these effects are largely the result of moral rather than economic or security judgments. Thus, the
acceptance of a political settlement depends not only on its concrete details, but in large part on the political cues that frame judgments of fairness. The diplomatic framing and response of societal actors appears to play a principal role in the settlement of disputes.

When the political framing determines the attractiveness of a settlement, conventional representations of conflicts are inappropriate. To illustrate this point, we also present the results of a smaller companion experiment on a representative sample of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. We show that there is no reason to assume that actor preferences are characterized by risk aversion, or even that they are increasing in shares of the true objects of negotiations. A mutually preferred, negotiated solution may not exist. Conflict also cannot be modeled as a lottery over the extremes of a bargaining space because framings that influence preferences \textit{ex ante} are not available \textit{ex post}. Thus, representations of conflict processes will better fit political realities when these assumptions are relaxed.

\textbf{When Is a Concession Palatable?}

Where do the preferences of states originate? A substantial portion of international relations scholarship views interests as deriving from fear and the anarchic material environment of states (Mearsheimer 2001, Waltz 1979). Another set of scholars are more agnostic about the sources of state interests, but treat them as exogenous to conflict processes. Scholars in the rationalist tradition are in this camp (Fearon 1995, Schultz 2001, Kydd 2005). Constructivist scholars often take the opposite view, conceiving of preferences as evolving out of processes of interaction (Wendt 1999, Finnemore and Sikkink (2001)). These scholars address the question of preference origins most directly, and often see them as deriving from socially constructed identities.

As an empirical matter, these differing views of preference origins are difficult to disentangle. States may act for security reasons, material gain, or due to some understanding of what constitutes fairness, among other motivations. They may view the disputed territory as historically connected to their nations,
or believe that unjust actions by their adversaries merit punishment (Stein 2015). But what evidence could demonstrate whether a particular conflict is truly driven by a disagreement about what is fair or by a simple desire for more of disputed goods? Disagreements about fairness often result in material claims. Claims for material goods must often be cloaked in demands for some form of justice. Even conflict participants themselves may not evaluate the true sources of their own motivations correctly. Actors may be convinced they are acting on strategic grounds even when their affective response to the situation is the more important explanation for behavior (Haidt 2001). Conversely, self-interest sometimes influences actors’ affective responses and understandings of fairness (Messick and Sentis 1979, Dawes and Thaler 1988, 195, Rabin 1998, 16). Thus, because individuals and states may act for many reasons, often have incentives to hide their true motivations for political purposes, and may not even understand the true drivers of their own actions, it is difficult to isolate the true motivational processes that are at work. Observable shifts in conduct can rarely be assigned to shifts in preferences because strategic calculations and cognitive biases often provide plausible alternative accounts.

In this article, we show experimentally that preferences are indeed endogenous to the conflict process, and that they derive in important ways from non-material aspects of situations. Shifts in preferences occur as a result of factors that are not the result of strategic calculations. Instead, these shifts are best explained by individuals’ understandings of what constitutes justice for a group with which they identify. Perceived injustices that result in indignation produce a desire for concessions for concessions’ sake. Understandings of fairness are in turn mediated by affective responses to the political framing of events.

The influence of emotions on international relations is a subject of growing interest. Scholars have argued that emotion can be wielded strategically as part of diplomatic signaling (Hall 2011, Hall and Ross 2015, Hall 2015, Wong 2015) and that, for example, signaling contrition and remorse for past actions might help build trust between nations (Lind 2011). Emotions play a role in the fundamental processes of international affairs, such as establishing deterrence, building political influence, peacebuilding, and
securing adherence to international norms (Crawford 2000). Beyond the expediency of emotional appeals for political actors, however, other scholars have examined the role that emotions play in political decision making, including how emotions mold political perceptions and beliefs (Mercer 2010). Indeed, political analysts and neuro-scientists alike are increasingly identifying the substantial influences that pre-conscious processes and emotions exert on all elements of political cognition (Marcus 2000, Barrett 2006, Ross 2013). In politics, as in all else, emotions are part of the processes through which people confront uncertainty and navigate change (Angie et al. 2011, Druckman & McDermott 2008). Accordingly, collective emotions appear to play a significant role in shaping political attitudes and thus, also, in perpetuating conflicts (Bar Tal 2013, Volkan 1988). Some scholars have, as a result, sought to measure the impact of emotions on political attitudes and whether collective emotions can be regulated to promote conflict resolution (Halperin 2011, Cohen-Chen 2013).

Emotions operate as a means of appraisal whose influence may exceed that of deliberative processes, particularly when it comes to the adoption of ends, as opposed to the means of achieving them. The vast majority of information processing is done pre-consciously and non-cognitively, with the brain processing up to 11 million pieces of information unconsciously every second, versus 40 processed consciously (Brader and Marcus 2013). Pre-conscious judgments are often transmitted to consciousness via initially-unrefined emotions (Brader and Marcus 2013, Lerner et al. 2003). Initial emotions triggered in response to a stimulus then influence and bound later cognitive evaluation of that stimulus, for example by promoting attention to facts congruent with those emotions or in determining the depth of our cognitive processing (Renshon and Lerner 2010, Brader and Marcus 2013). Thus, much of the appraisals that we perform occur first outside of consciousness until the result is felt as an emotion (Spezio and Adolphs 2007, Stein 2008, Moll and de Oliveira-Souza 2007).

the emotions triggered by political communication has an impact on how the content of that message is then evaluated (Petty et al. 2001). Moreover, people tend to adjust their attitudes to fit their emotional responses (Petty et al. 2001, Haidt 2001, Haidt and Joseph 2004). By triggering specific emotions, then, one might be able to change the way populations respond to political information (Brader 2006, 18). For instance, even incidental anxious arousal (i.e., arousal that is induced via stimuli unrelated to the object of evaluation) has an appreciable effect on attitudes regarding immigration policy (Renshon, Lee and Tingley 2015).

Researchers have started to map the varying effects of discrete emotions on political cognition (Nabi 2002, Nabi 2010), and a growing literature employs this neuroscience research to explore how collective emotion regulation may serve as a means to help resolve intractable conflicts. In one study, subjects’ willingness to have direct contact with members of a rival group increased when anxiety with respect to the conflict was reduced by informing subjects that the other group’s behavior was malleable and liable to be improved with time (Halperin et al. 2014). Other research suggests that hope for the future induced in subjects via the manipulation of beliefs regarding the conflict leads to a higher willingness to make political concessions (Cohen-Chen et al. 2013).

Appeals to pre-conscious, emotional judgment – in order to influence political attitudes – have been achieved via survey experiment treatments that alter the framing and the emotional priming associated with presented political facts (Lecheler et al. 2013, DeSteno 2004). Scholars have also shown that emotions mediate the effect of decision frames and thereby influence decision making under risk, including with respect to political attitudes regarding compromise: enthusiasm, inter alia, correlates with risk-seeking behavior while anxiety correlates with risk aversion (Druckman and McDermott 2008). Negative emotions such as revulsion and anger may also increase risk-seeking behavior. Anger has, in addition, been shown to produce increased reliance on heuristics and reflexive processing (Griskevicius and Neufeld 2010). In lab experiments, subjects experiencing anger further showed a preference for punitive policies – immediate
retribution toward those responsible for a social problem – over more effective reparative or preventative alternatives (Gault and Sabini 2000). Similarly, in another study, anger in respondents predicted support for war as a response for terrorism (Cheung-Blunden et al. 2008).

Disgust and distaste have, like anger to which they are related, been shown to exert a significant influence on later moral evaluation when they are induced. In particular, they amplify the perceived salience of negative facts, leading to harsher moral judgments (Ivan 2015, Eskine et al. 2011, Horberg et al. 2009, Schnall et al., 2008, Ugazio et al., 2012, Wheatley and Haidt 2005). Revulsion has thus been shown to negatively affect political attitudes regarding out-groups (Hodson and Costello 2007) and to strengthen dehumanizing biases and violent behavior toward out-group members (Buckells and Trapnell 2013, Matsumoto et al. 2015).

Emotions also mediate perceptions of fairness of material outcomes. For example, experiments have shown that induced positive emotions correlated with perceptions that price increases were fair while, in contrast, other experiments demonstrated that participants in an ultimatum game were more likely to make fair offers and to reject unfair offers when in a negative mood (Heussler et al. 2009, Forgas and Tan 2013). Feelings of disgust have been shown to significantly increase sensitivity to unfairness and rejection of unfair outcomes (Moretti and Pellegrino 2010).

Perceptions of fairness in turn shape foreign policy attitudes by serving as an evaluation heuristic (Albin 2001, Zartman and Kremenyuk 2005). For example, survey respondents who reported prioritizing fairness as one of their moral foundations were more likely to support cooperative internationalist policies as well as internationalism involving the use of force (Kertzer et al. 2014, Kertzer and Rathbun 2015). Fairness perceptions have been found to influence international economic (Kapstein 2006, 2008) and legal (Franck 1995) relations. More equitable agreements are more durable (Druckman and Albin 2011) and procedurally fair processes make compromise easier to attain (Albin and Druckman 2012). In the Palestinian-Israeli context itself, a study of Israeli attitudes demonstrates that perceptions of Palestinian blameworthiness
correlate with preferences for punitive policies (Pickett et al. 2014).

Thus, although international political negotiations center on material matters, there is a long tradition of scholarship demonstrating that resistance to compromise and willingness to employ violence are strongly influenced by emotional factors. There are both theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that humans engage in a strong form of reciprocity that relates to an emotional reaction that goes beyond strategic calculation. Theoretically, under plausible assumptions about conditions prevalent during human evolution, the trait for cooperating with cooperators and punishing defectors becomes ubiquitous in populations (Bowles and Gintis 1999, Gintis 2000, Sethi and Somanathan 2000 and 2001). Empirically, many experimental studies demonstrate behavior consistent with reciprocity, even at personal cost. Ultimatum game participants regularly reject low offers even though the rationalist equilibrium implies acceptance (Güth and Tietz 1990, Roth 1995, Camerer and Thaler 1995). It is noteworthy that rates of rejection of offers vary little across cultures because individuals understand local fairness expectations and adjust their offers accordingly (Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara and Zamir 1991). Reciprocity at personal cost has also been demonstrated experimentally in other strategic contexts, including public goods games (Isaac, Walker and Williams 1994, Fehr and Gächter 2000). In fact, across a wide range of contexts, actors are willing to pay costs to punish those who have done them harm or who violate norms of justice (Giacalone and Greenberg 1997, Rabin 1993, Blount 1995, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 1999, Falk and Fischbacher 1999, Levine 1998). If negotiating adversaries are perceived as acting fairly, actors are more willing to compromise (Tyler 1988, Casper, Tyler and Fisher 1988, Landls and Goodstein 1986, Lind and Tyler 1988). Dealing honestly and following ethical principles in conduct are central to evaluations of fairness (Tyler 1988).

History is full of cases of group violence carried out as revenge for unjust treatment. Ethnic violence is usually accompanied by a narrative of righting past wrongs committed by the attacked group. For instance, U.S. cities experience riots connected to perceptions of systematic injustice towards racial or ethnic groups. Following brutal treatment by Serb forces, Kosovo Albanian groups executed ethnic Serbs and suspected
collaborators in the years after the Kosovo War. German atrocities against Jews in the 1930s and 40s were rooted in part in revenge narratives, as was the mass rape of German women following the World War. Revenge motivations may have contributed to the German decision to fight the Second World War following the humiliating settlement imposed after the first (Keynes 2013, Barnhart 2015, 2016a,b) and the need for vengeance is a contributing factor in many other cases of international conflict (Stein 2015).

Thus, individuals will feel indignant and seek to punish those whom they perceive to have intended to harm them without cause or commit injustice against them. We define indignation as a state involving anger, disgust and contempt that is evoked in observers by agents who “intentionally and without provocation or adequate reason, [cause] a victim to suffer harm” (Kahneman and Sunstein 2007, 10, Rozin et. al 1999). Thus, indignation differs from mere anger in that it also involves an element of moral disgust at the behavior and contempt for its authors and, therefore, is an emotion that promotes retributive or punitive action. Our view is consistent with the account in Gries (2005), according to which indignation is associated with a loss of dignity and a need to restore it. In the context of negotiating agreements, we expect indignation to imply that individuals will seek harsher terms and be less willing to compromise following perceived injustices. An implication is that the difficulty of finding compromises in long-running conflicts is not merely a function of exogenous preferences and strategic factors, but is determined endogenously by affective processes of the conflict.

The emotional dynamics of the response to perceived injustice go well beyond a desire to recover what was lost, however (Levy 1992). Actors often seek to punish and this seems to have a relationship regulating function in humans and other social animals. This response relates to an immediate emotional reaction, to further analysis or rationalization of the rightness of the action (Haidt 2001), and to means-ends analysis of the most effective method. In fact, most violence committed across levels of social aggregation may be “moral” in the sense of done to right an injustice in the eyes of the perpetrator of violence (Fiske and Rai 2014). In the Palestinian-Israeli context itself, Ginges et al. (2007), Ginges et al. (2011), and Ginges and

These considerations lead us to the expectation that the preferences of individuals following perceived injustice will be strongly influenced by the need to see that the offending party is punished and that this will be evaluated in large part through social cues rather than objective measures. We further expect that individuals will closely identify with political groups in long-running conflicts such as that between Israelis and Palestinians (Bar Tal 2013). These conflicts are more likely to be characterized by rigid us/them divides and group-strengthening behavior that heightens automatic emotional responses to events (Greenwald and Pettigrew 2014). On an emotional level, group welfare becomes entangled with personal welfare, and perceived threats to the group (or the extant moral order) are emotionally received as threats to individual security (Bar Tal 2013, 82, Lege and Wald 2007, Volkan 2014, Halperin 2011). Thus, injustice and its appropriate response will be evaluated in group terms.

Empirically distinguishing between preferences that derive from material factors and those that derive from psychological and emotional dynamics is not simple, however. Emotions can cause actors to develop stronger attachments to the material goods in dispute. Thus, the simple desire for more may appear to be at the heart of disputes when in fact affective processes have created the situation in which more is preferred to peaceful compromise.

We address these issues in several ways. First, we hold the material outcome constant while demonstrating that framings that influence perceptions of fairness have substantial effects on approval of a dispute settlement. We expect approval to be lower when framings that evoke indignation about the behavior of an adversary in the past interact with the framing of a settlement as a concession. We refer to this as the Scales of Justice Hypothesis. In evaluating it, we show that moral considerations are the principle mediators of this effect. Next, we test whether the changes in approval that result from changes in material conditions of a settlement are also strongly mediated by fairness evaluations. We refer to this as the
**Fairness Mediation of Material Change Hypothesis.**¹

**Scales of Justice Hypothesis:** When a negotiating adversary is framed as acting unjustly, the framing of a settlement as a concession imposed on that side will increase the perception of fairness, and therefore also approval, of the settlement, holding the material outcome constant.

**Fairness Mediation of Material Change Hypothesis:** Approval of settlements will be substantially determined by judgments of the fairness. Marginally better material outcomes elicit higher approval because they are judged more fair.

The *Scales of Justice Hypothesis* contrasts with the argument in Hassner (2009) that the indivisibility of Jerusalem’s Temple Mount is an inherent quality of that space, the fruit of “fundamental social facts” – such as competing religious attachments – that leaders “cannot easily define and redefine” (Hassner 2009, 10-11). Accordingly, Hassner argues that tensions over Jerusalem will “erupt as soon as one party perceives changes in the balance of power” over its holy spaces (Hassner 2009, 24), leaving little hope that a negotiated settlement over the Temple Mount in Jerusalem can ever be reached.² Our hypothesis is more consistent with the argument in Goddard (2009, 18, 39), which views indivisibility as constructed through legitimating political rhetoric. Goddard thus asks whether Jerusalem’s indivisibility can be undone by the rhetoric of well-placed actors (Ibid., 207). For such rhetoric endorsing compromise to be perceived as

¹Note that this is also consistent with the literature that shows that the fairness of a procedure is evaluated in terms of the fairness of the outcome (Lind, Kanfer and Earley 1990, Van den Bos et al. 1997, Van den Bos 1999). More favorable individual outcomes are judged to have been arrived through more fair processes. This constitutes a form of bias in individual evaluations of fairness (Messick and Sentis 1979, Dawes and Thaler 1988, 195, Rabin 1998, 16).

²Svensson (2007) also argues that territorial disputes anchored in religious claims lead to perceptions of indivisibility and are much less likely to be resolved via negotiation.
legitimate, Goddard theorizes that it must emanate from leaders centrally located in salient “social and cultural networks” (Ibid., 19). We ask how the induced perception of an adversary as acting unjustly, which is related to the elite framing of events (Berinsky 2009), influences population preferences over the forms of an acceptable settlement.³

Experimental Design

To analyze these issues, we conducted a large-scale experiment on a representative sample of Israeli Jews (N = 1,960). The experiment, which was embedded in an opinion poll, presented respondents with hypothetical negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel whereby the sides agreed to a two state solution that would divide Jerusalem, including the Old City, and determine sovereignty over the Temple Mount or Haram al-Sharif, a site holy to both Jews and Muslims. Our treatments randomized (1) whether Israel or the Palestinian Authority were described as forced to concede to divided sovereignty over the Temple Mount, although the divided-sovereignty outcome was constant in both treatments and (2) whether indignation was induced in respondents by reporting statements by Palestinian leaders praising violence against Israeli citizens. We also included a control condition (12% of respondents), which does not frame either side as having imposed a concession and does not include the indignation treatment, and a treatment with an objectively better outcome from the standpoint of Israeli negotiators (8% of respondents). In the latter condition, Israel keeps full sovereignty over the Temple Mount. After describing the negotiations and their outcomes, we asked whether participants in the survey approved, disapproved or felt indifferent about the outcome, on a 5-point scale. In order to control for the influence of the treatments on perceptions that the sides would faithfully execute the deal, we informed respondents that monitors from Egypt, Jordan and

³Goddard argues that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, due to his lack of ties to Islamist groups, cannot legitimize any division of Jerusalem’s holy spaces by himself (Ibid., 26). We do not investigate the differing impacts of differently positioned political and religious elites, but highlight this as a topic for future research.
the United States would guarantee and enforce the agreement.\(^4\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome 1 – Control Group (12% of respondents)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Shared sovereignty over Temple Mount; Jewish right of prayer</td>
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<td>- No concession framing, no indignation treatment</td>
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<th>Outcome 1 – Fully Crossed</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Palestinian Concession</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>No Indignation Treatment</td>
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<td>Indignation Treatment</td>
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<tr>
<th>Outcome 2 – Better Objective Outcome (8% of respondents)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Israeli sovereignty over Temple Mount; Jewish right of prayer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- No concession framing, no indignation treatment</td>
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</table>

**Figure 1. Distribution of Treatments Among Respondents.**

We also asked a series of other questions following the vignettes. These were designed to measure the factors that mediate the effects of the treatments and to more precisely establish the theoretical mechanisms at work. Here we focused in particular on whether the treatments influenced perceptions of fairness or perceptions of the side’s prospects in negotiations. Thus, we asked whether respondents viewed the settlement as fair, whether it should be considered for economic reasons, and whether it was the best deal available. We asked in addition whether respondents believed the deal would be faithfully executed due to the presence of international monitors. These mediators are discussed further below.

\(^4\)Note that Egypt and Israel have been cooperating openly on anti-terrorism efforts.
The experiment was fielded in October and November 2015, a period of heightened violence, including stabbings and car ramming attacks, as well as other violence triggered by tensions over the Temple Mount, both within Israeli cities and in the West Bank. Thus, our survey examined Israeli attitudes regarding Jerusalem as a live issue in the midst of a volatile, emotionally raw moment. We avoid the problem of non-attitudes and other pitfalls of posing hypothetical scenarios in survey research by asking respondents about matters that deeply concern them, sticking closely to plausible scenarios of which participants are well aware.

The experiment, conducted in Hebrew, began by emphasizing that the researchers were not associated with either of the parties. We then presented respondents with a scenario whereby during recent secret talks, the US, Israel and the Palestinian Authority discussed a division of Jerusalem as part of a permanent peace agreement between Israel and a new, sovereign State of Palestine. We described the division of Jerusalem envisaged by the deal: Israel would get Jewish neighbourhoods and Palestine would get Arab neighbourhoods; the Old City would be divided in half, with the Christian and Muslim quarters going to Palestine, and the Jewish and Armenian Quarters going to Israel; Israel would retain control of the Western Wall. The full text of the experiment appears in the appendix.

To investigate the effects of indignation on willingness to make concessions for peace, we randomized whether we informed respondents of actual, recent statements by Palestinian leaders associating the national Palestinian cause with acts of violence against Israeli civilians. This approach is consistent with psychology studies that ask study participants to read news articles to prime emotional states (Johnson and Tversky 1983, DeSteno et al. 2000, Wegener and Petty 1994), and with studies of indignation or outrage in particular (Grobe, Douthitt, and Zepeda 1999, Sandman et al. 1993, Wiedemann, Clauberg, and Schutz 2003). In our experiment, two treatment groups (of 425 respondents each) read that

Critics of negotiations point out that the Palestinian leadership has used violence against civilians as a political tool. Palestinian President Mahmood Abbas has said that terrorists in Israeli
jails “did what we, we, ordered them.” In the wake of recent terror attacks in Jerusalem, he said that Palestinian leaders “welcome every drop of blood spilled in Jerusalem... blood on its way to Allah. With the help of Allah, every martyr will be in heaven.” Fatah leader and former Palestinian security chief, Jibril Rajoub has called recent stabbing attacks and murders, such as that of the Henkin couple, “heroic.” Rajoub echoed other Palestinian leaders, such as former General Intelligence director in the West Bank Tawfik Tirawi, in saying that stabbing attacks should be turned “into a national strategy.”

Among those being presented with this information, half were told that Israel was forced by Palestinian negotiators to concede to divided sovereignty over the Temple Mount, while the other half were told that the Israeli government forced the Palestinian Authority to concede to the same. Thus, we varied only the framing of one provision of a larger agreement whose other provisions were also listed in the vignette. In all of these cases, the facts of agreement were held constant and were described in precisely the same way. Those who did not receive the indignation prime also received the concession framing treatments. The concession and indignation treatments were thus fully crossed. The experiment was designed to detect a difference in the effects of the concession framing treatments when indignation was primed and when it was not. Distinguishing this difference in differences required that 80% of respondents be assigned to these four treatments shown in the central box of Figure 1.

To investigate the mechanisms involved, we also considered several potential confounders of our theory that evaluations of the fairness of the outcome were influenced by the treatments and in turn influenced popular approval. Framing the settlement as a defeat for one side may create the impression that the other side has received an objectively better deal. This is an alternative explanation of the impact of the treatments on approval if the effect of the treatment is therefore to cause respondents to believe that
material and economic aspects of the agreement are more favorable to one side.\footnote{When compromises are framed as being offered by an opponent in a negotiation, those compromises are sometimes “reactively devalued”; publics caught in conflicts approve of concessions more when these concessions are proposed by their own side (Maoz et al. 2002). Past literature has viewed this phenomenon as resulting from a signal about the quality of the agreement rather than an emotional reaction to a social context.} If this mechanism were the key driver of an effect of the concession framing, we would expect it to be equally strong following both indignation framings. The design of the experiment therefore addresses this issue directly. If the concession framing has a larger impact contingent upon the indignation prime, as we predict, this speaks strongly against this alternative explanation. To investigate this possibility further, in the questions following the survey vignette, participants were asked whether the agreement “should be considered for economic reasons, whether or not it is fair.” We also asked if participants believed that “it is NOT possible for Israel to negotiate a better deal.” If the treatments are affecting participant’s evaluations of material aspects of the deal, this will be reflected in the answers to these questions.

Another potential confounding factor is the impressions the treatments create about whether the deal will be lasting. A forced concession by a negotiating adversary may appear less likely to be carried out. Alternatively, a forced concession by one’s own side may be believed to invite an adversary to demand more in spite of the current settlement. To account for these possibilities, we checked whether participants believed that the deal would be enforced or lead to further violence against Israel. Participants were asked whether the monitors from Egypt, Jordan and the United States would ensure that “the new Palestinian state is indeed peaceful and does not become a base of terrorism against Israel.” Alongside the question about the fairness of the agreement, these questions were treated as four potential mediators of treatment effects.
Results

The *Scales of Justice Hypothesis* receives strong support, both in the effect of the treatments on the approval of the settlement, and in the mediation analysis. Approval of a settlement is dependent upon the interaction of the indignation and concession treatments, as Figure 2 shows. Under the indignation treatment, when shared sovereignty over the Temple Mount is described as having been forced upon Palestinian negotiators rather forced upon Israeli negotiators, approval of the settlement is 9 percentage points higher. This difference is significant at the .01 confidence level using a two-tailed test. In the absence of an indignation prime, approval is actually higher when Israeli negotiators are described as having made a concession, although this difference is not significant. The difference in these differences, demonstrating that the effect of the concession framing is contingent upon indignation, is also significant at the .01 confidence level. These effects are confirmed by regression analysis with demographic controls, available in the Online Appendix.
Changes in the objective provisions of the settlement also influenced approval. When Israel retains sovereignty over the Temple Mount, settlement approval increases by 10 percentage points over the control condition. This tells us that Israelis are sensitive to this aspect of negotiations, but not why they are so.

To deepen the analysis, we investigated four mechanisms through which the framing and provisions of a settlement might drive public support. Recall that the first proposed mechanism concerns what respondents perceive to be fair. We used the responses to construct a scale with five levels: totally unfair (0), somewhat unfair (25), neither fair nor unfair (50), somewhat fair (75), or totally fair (100). The next two mechanisms concern the economics and bargaining logic of making a deal. We asked participants both whether the deal should be considered for economic reasons, whether or not it is fair, and whether the deal is the best attainable. The final mechanism investigates whether participants trust the agreement would
be successfully enforced. We used the answers to these last three questions to construct scales with five levels: strongly disagree (0), somewhat disagree (25), neither agree nor disagree (50), somewhat agree (75), or strongly agree (100).

As Figure 3 illustrates, under the indignation prime, the concession framing treatment influences all of the mediators. The largest effect is on the perception that the deal is fair. This effect is significant at the .01 level, and all of the other effects are significant at the .05 level. Thus, our expectations about the factors that would mediate the effect on approval are borne out.

![Figure 3. Effect of Forcing a Concession on Mediators, Indignation Framing.](image)

How did the mediators affect support for the proposed political deal? To find out, we performed a linear regression of approval for the deal on the four mediators. The regression model included demographic controls, including for gender, age bracket, level of education, family situation and income. We also controlled for one attitudinal variable, right-wing political views. Finally, we included indicators for the
treatments. Thus, the regression was designed to isolate how beliefs about fairness, economic motivators, trust, quality of the deal and resolvability of the conflict itself affect approval of the proposed deal, as outlined.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mediators</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std Error</th>
<th>P value</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deal is fair</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deal is best that can be achieved</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deal should be considered for economic reasons</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deal will be enforced</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<td>Controls</td>
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<td>Treatment (not shown)</td>
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<td>Political orientation</td>
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<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.754</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Note: P values are based on a two-tailed test

Table 1. Effect of the Mediators on Settlement Approval.

As Table 1 shows, all four mediators substantially affected support for the proposed deal (with all related coefficients being highly significant). Perceptions of fairness outweighed other considerations, however. The other mediators, which can be described as material and instrumental considerations (i.e. economic benefits, reliability and quality of the deal) had important but far less significant influences on approval levels of the proposed settlement. The political orientation of respondents also had a dramatic effect on settlement support, as expected.

We use the results from Figure 3 and Table 1 to evaluate the relative importance of the four mediators. We find that the fairness mediator accounts for about 54% of the total effect of the framing treatment on approval when subjects receive the indignation prime. This result is obtained by first noting that the
fraction of Jewish Israeli respondents who consider the deal fair increases 7 points when joint sovereignty over the Temple Mount is framed as having been forced on the Palestinian side over when it is framed as forced on the Israeli side. Second, note from Table 1 that a change from considering the deal totally unfair to considering the deal totally fair is associated with a 57% increase in the likelihood of supporting the deal. Thus, multiplying $0.57 \times 0.7$ and dividing by the total treatment effect of 9 points yields the fraction of the treatment effect that is accounted for by the fairness mediator (54%). The two economic mediators combined account for a little under a quarter of the total effect, and confidence that the deal would be enforced accounted for another 10%. This analysis is presented in the left-hand column of Table 2.\(^6\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mediator</th>
<th>Percent of Total Effect</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Framing Treatment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fairness</td>
<td>54%</td>
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<td>Economic Considerations</td>
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<td>Best Bargaining Outcome</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>Enforcement</td>
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<td>Other Mechanisms</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outcome Treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>

We performed a similar mediation analysis on changes in the actual negotiated outcome from shared sovereignty to full Israeli sovereignty over the Temple Mount. As the right hand column of Figure 4 demonstrates, we find strong support for the Fairness Mediation of Material Change Hypothesis. In particular, fairness considerations drive an even greater proportion of the result, over two thirds. This provides ad-

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\(^6\)Note that because we employ linear models, this form of mediation analysis is mathematically equivalent to that recommended in Imai, Keele and Tingley (2010).
ditional evidence that even when tangible issues of control are directly at stake in negotiations, a moral calculus, and cues about what constitutes a fair outcome given past history, may drive conflict dynamics.

Discussion

The results demonstrate that the framing of a settlement as a compromise forced on one side or the other can have a substantial impact on whether the compromise is palatable. This effect occurs when there is a perception of past injustice committed by a negotiating adversary. We have also provided evidence that this effect is primarily the result of moral considerations rather than inferences made about the attainability, quality or sustainability of the negotiated outcome.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that such effects have prolonged influence in real world conflicts. Outrage at a negotiating adversary’s support for terrorism may trigger the need to force a concession, thereby limiting the set of acceptable negotiated outcomes. Coll (2009) argues that, on the question of control in Kashmir, an agreed settlement between India and Pakistan was abandoned because leaders believed it would be unpopular following perceived Pakistani government complicity in the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. Similarly, in late 2014, near complete peace talks between the Colombian government and F.A.R.C. rebels – that could have resolved a decades long conflict – were suspended by Colombia after Marxist rebels kidnapped a Colombian general. Among the principle reasons for the suspension appears to have been widespread public outrage. Kydd and Walter (2002) argue that such effects are a rationalist calculation about the ability and willingness of an adversary to exercise control over extremist elements, but this misses the popular and emotional aspects of peace-process dynamics. To the extent that negotiating partners are seen as in control of actions that are perceived to be unjust, emotional reactions require settlements in which the scales of justice are balanced.

One implication is that in conflicts that are framed by narratives of indignation, the appearance of negotiating defeat can serve the cause of peace. Political leaders must weigh a tradeoff, however. The
appearance of negotiating defeat makes a settlement more palatable to an adversary, but it may also
demonstrate weakness or a willingness to compromise and thereby embolden the adversary in the future.
In fact, the appearance of weakness will be blamed for the spoiler attacks attacks that often accompany
attempts at settlements (Kydd and Walter 2002), create a post-settlement narrative against making further
concessions. Thus, although we do not directly examine these effects here, we believe peacemakers will
often need to balance the short-term benefits of the appearance of negotiating defeat against potential
longer-term costs, particularly when a full settlement of the ongoing dispute has not been reached.

Since publics take cues about fairness in political contexts from elites (Gottfried and Trager 2016), the
elite framing of the behavior of adversaries as illegitimate will have a substantial impact on what is politi-
cally possible. Constructing the behavior of an adversary as unjust may be an important tool of popular
mobilization for elites in conflictual situations. But once undertaken, the range of possible settlements may
also be restricted to those that appear as imposition. Of course, restricting the bargaining space through
rhetoric that influences popular reactions to a settlement may also be employed as a negotiating strategy
(Fearon 1994).

How long indignation framings have these effects is an important topic for future research. Political
outcomes are evaluated by publics caught in conflict through the lens of their collective memory, which,
particularly in apparently intractable conflicts, is often comprised of narratives that highlight adversaries’
immoral character (Bar Tal 2013, 141-149). Thus, a public that has long experienced indignation with
respect to a certain adversary is likely to interpret new events in light of that collective memory and to
experience indignation again. New, perceived injustices embed themselves in a long narrative of related
perceived injustices, and trigger and reinforce emotional pathways (Bar Tal 2013, 221-222). In the case of
our experiment, respondents’ indignation was triggered by Palestinian leaders’ recent statements but drew
on a longstanding perceptions among the Israeli public. The experiment also demonstrates, however, that
these narratives are latent until triggered by specific framings in the moment. Therefore, although these
issues merit further study, the evidence suggests that elite cues at critical junctures in peace processes can facilitate public acceptances of changes to the *status quo*, even in long-running conflicts.

We now turn to the question of what implication these findings have for rationalist explanations for war, and in particular for the question of whether negotiated solutions exist that both sides would prefer to war. The answer depends on whether the sides in a conflict occupy a single social space or whether instead leaders on each side can make statements and frame the conflict for their own publics without opposing publics becoming aware. In certain circumstances, particularly in the distant past, this may have been possible. The Treaty of Kadesh from 1259 BCE, for instance, is represented slightly differently in Hieroglyphics on the walls of Karnak in Egypt and in the Akkadian language on the giant clay tablets found at the Hittite capital of Hatusha. Both leaders appear to have been attempting to give favorable signals to their own audiences. Even then, however, the Hittite king knew enough of Egyptian affairs following the Battle of Kadesh to write to the Pharaoh Ramses II to chastise him for claiming a decisive victory when the result had been closer to a draw.\(^7\)

In modern times, the cultural spaces occupied by opposing publics are more unified. For instance, Palestinian officials’ statements in support of violence have often been used by Israeli opponents of peace talks to argue that Palestinian leaders cannot be trusted, and have thus had an impact on Israeli perceptions of the peace process. One such politically salient moment came less than a week after signing the Cairo Accord of 1994. While speaking in a mosque in South Africa, Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman and later President of the Palestinian National Authority Yasser Arafat called on Muslims to join a “Jihad” to liberate Jerusalem and compared the accords he had just signed to Mohammed’s temporary, tactical pact with the Quraysh Jewish tribe.\(^8\) This speech was later replayed on Israeli radio and led to much public


\(^8\)The full speech is available at http://www.textfiles.com/politics/arafat.txt.
criticism of Israel’s government for engaging in talks with President Arafat at all. He, in turn, argued that he had referred to a peaceful jihad, but Yitzhak Rabin, Israel’s Prime Minister, dismissed this explanation, said President Arafat had caused a “crisis of trust” between Israel and the Palestinian leadership that threatened the new peace process, and demanded that Arafat publicly affirm his commitment to peace. Similar episodes have recurred, and the present Israeli government has made Palestinian “incitement” of violence a central focus of its characterization of the Palestinian leadership. It appears that partly for this reason, in recent polls, a strong majority of Israelis indicate that, despite wanting peace talks to resume, they do not trust Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas.

Thus, it is important in the modern world to consider the bargaining dynamics when leaders speak to all when they speak to their own. To facilitate these considerations, we present results from a companion experiment conducted in Arabic on a representative sample of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Due to the controversial nature of the topic, a large number of households either declined to be interviewed at all or refused to listen to the survey vignette. This left us with a sample of 384 households that answered the survey and passed checks demonstrating that they had followed the survey vignette. This population of respondents does not differ substantially on demographic measures from the total Palestinian population or from the total population that we attempted to interview, but we nevertheless consider the results obtained as illustrative of what such experiments might discover rather representative of the true preferences in the population. Further information about this experiment can be found in online Appendix A.

The West Bank and Gaza experiment used the same vignettes and treatments, but we did not specifically prime for indignation in the Palestinian context. Both experiments also included a treatment, not discussed above, which informed participants that the settlement had been supported by Palestinian reli-

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gious authorities. The results of this treatment in both populations form part of the discussion below.

To see how the political framing of a settlement in a unified cultural space relates to rationalist explanations for conflict, consider Figure 5. Here, we represent leader incentives to compromise as corresponding to popular approval of a settlement (Tomz 2007, Trager and Vavreck 2011, Kertzer and Brutger 2015, Gottfried and Trager 2016). If the Israeli population is primed by elites with the indignation treatment, what leader incentives are implied? The solid line in the Figure represents Israeli approval of a settlement under different treatment conditions with outcomes ordered such that approval is increasing. First, notice that as it is drawn, the mapping from outcomes to approval is not characterized by global risk aversion. This violates the traditional assumption guarantying the existence of a negotiated solution that both sides prefer to war (Fearon 1995). In fact, when conflicts center on political framing and categorical outcomes, the concept of risk aversion is incoherent because negotiations are not over amounts of a commodity, which means there is no natural understanding of a “distance” between outcomes - as there may be in the case of territorial outcomes (O’Neill 2001a). We also have no reason to expect, however, that this assumption
would hold in an approximated or altered fashion. To see why, consider two goods that two players could possess or not possess and suppose utilities are additive and separable. Assuming adjacent points are equidistant, it is then impossible for both monotonicity and concavity to hold. To see why, suppose the first player cares more about good A than good B, so \( u_1(1, 0) > u_1(0, 1) \). For Player 1’s utility to be increasing over the whole issue space, the ordering of outcomes must then be \((0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)\). In intuitive terms, this violates concavity because the point \( u_1(0, 1) \) lies below the line between the points on either side. Thus, when there are a series of categorical factors that frame the desirability of a settlement, such as which side is perceived to have forced a concession and which political elites endorse it, there is no reason to expect, a priori, that a settlement exists that both sides prefer to conflict.

The dashed line in Figure 5 represents Palestinian approval at the same settlement outcomes. Notice that Palestinian approval is non-monotonic, again violating the assumptions of traditional models. This form of violation of the traditional assumptions guaranteeing a mutually preferred negotiated solution will also be the norm, not the exception, in contests over framing and categorical outcomes. Loosely speaking, monotonicity will be violated (in every ordering of categorical outcomes) whenever one side cares much more about one aspect of an outcome than the other side does. This implies that the sides’ preference orderings over outcomes are not mirror images.

Following Fearon (1995), most formal international relations scholarship models conflict as a costly lottery over extreme points in a bargaining space. The side that wins, in other words, can choose its most preferred bargaining outcome. This assumption appears reasonable when material goods are at issue, but it too may not make sense when the framing of potential settlements is a primary object of negotiations.  

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12 To consider these matters more formally, we need to define the the set of outcomes as a metric space. If the points are represented on a line according to the Figure 5 ordering with unit distances between adjacent points, the mapping is not globally concave, as the Figure illustrates.

13 See, for example, Kydd (2005), Schultz (2001), Trager (2015, forthcoming).
The principal reason is that the same set of settlement options that is available to the parties before the conflict is not available, or may not be relevant, after the conflict is fought. Beforehand, a settlement may be acceptable to both sides if it is endorsed by certain political or cultural elites; afterward, those endorsements have a different meaning. As Figure 5 illustrates, the settlement that maximizes Israeli approval involves the endorsement of Palestinian religious figures, but this does not correspond to the low-point of Palestinian approval. If the Palestinian side loses a conflict, it would not make sense to view Palestinian leadership preferences over the outcome as comparable to a peaceful settlement endorsed by Palestinian religious authorities, discounted by some fixed cost of conflict. Rather, defeat involves its own set of elite framings and material conditions influencing elite preferences.

Thus, the traditional rationalist assumptions should only be expected to hold when the sides are disputing amounts of goods that both sides want. When preferences are significantly affected by political framings, there is no reason to expect opposite preferences over this expanded set of outcomes, much less global risk aversion. In fact, these common rationalist assumptions are unlikely to hold, even in an approximate form, when a series of discrete material questions are negotiated, and for some of the same reasons given above. Conceiving of a conflict as a lottery over outcomes in the bargaining space may also misrepresent what political actors care about - and what drives the conflict - ex ante.

The implication of these observations is not that rationalist theory has no role to play when non-material framings of settlements are an important aspect of negotiations between political elites. On the contrary, elites may be clear-eyed about what framings would be acceptable, and thus elite bargaining may be well described by rationalist theories. But it may be that in models of conflict processes, relaxing the three common assumptions described here - monotonicity, global risk aversion, and conflict as a lottery over bargaining extremes - will yield theory that more closely tracks political processes.
Conclusion

Constructivists tend to emphasize aspects of identity that are malleable as a result of social processes that occur over long time scales. Socialization of one sort is thought to lead to an identity that implies one set of policy preferences, while socialization of another sort produces leaders of an entirely different stripe. The results presented here demonstrate that the construction of the political context of peace settlements also happens on abbreviated time-scales. In moments when a negotiated solution to a conflict appears possible, what elites say about the past actions of opposing leaders has a significant effect on what settlements the public will accept. These findings also show the importance of the construction of the adversary rather than the self. Not just one’s own identity, but one’s image of one’s adversary, determines foreign policy preferences.

On this account, framings of a dispute that engender indignation are constituent elements of issue indivisibility. Like the staking of a bargaining reputation or a public statement that engenders audience costs, these narratives of the past can be used for bargaining leverage. They influence the sorts of settlements that are acceptable. Beyond their influence on the material facts of the settlement, however, they influence the political forms that it can take. Indignation creates an emotional need to balance the international political scales of justice, and this need promotes behavior that may be contrary to direct material self-interest. As a result, those who want peace should resist the demonization of an adversary. Those who want a better objective outcome for their side should understand that in contests where the emotions and narratives of indignation have been engaged, the political framing of a settlement can be traded for material concessions. Peace may require the appearance of negotiating defeat.

The fact that political and societal actors create these narratives and choose how and when to engage them for political purposes provides hope that political agency may overcome apparent indivisibilities. In these processes, the emotional states of the moment create a recipiency to settlements or a lack thereof,
even in populations that are already embedded in conflict narratives. As revolutions are said to appear impossible beforehand and inevitable afterwards, solving long-running conflicts may appear impossible until actors alter taken-for-granted social facts for the long-run through the emotional appeals of the moment.
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Kertzer, Joshua D and Brian C Rathbun. 2015. “Fair is Fair: Social Preferences and Reciprocity in International Politics.”


35


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Appendix A: Survey Experiment Text in English

**Version 2: Indignation treatment + Palestinian concession.**

“The following questions relate to recent negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. You will be asked whether you approve or disapprove of a hypothetical agreement between the two sides. The organization conducting this survey is not associated with either of the parties.

During recent secret talks, the US, Israel and the Palestinian Authority discussed a division of Jerusalem as part of a permanent peace agreement between Israel and a new, sovereign State of Palestine.

Critics of negotiations point out that the Palestinian leadership has used violence against civilians as a political tool. Palestinian President Mahmood Abbas has said that terrorists in Israeli jails "did what we, we, ordered them." In the wake of recent terror attacks in Jerusalem, he said that Palestinian leaders "welcome every drop of blood spilled in Jerusalem… blood on its way to Allah. With the help of Allah, every martyr will be in heaven." Fatah leader and former Palestinian security chief, Jibril Rajoub has called recent stabbing attacks and murders such as that of the Henkin couple “heroic.” Rajoub echoed other Palestinian leaders, such as former General Intelligence director in the West Bank Tawfik Tirawi, in saying that stabbing attacks should be turned "into a national strategy."

Supporters of the negotiations argue that a deal is the best hope for Israeli security over the long-run.

In the most recent negotiations, the Israeli government forced the Palestinian Authority to concede that there will be divided sovereignty over the Temple Mount between Israel and the Palestinians. There will be a new right of prayer on the Temple Mount for Jews.

Other aspects of the latest proposal include that Israel will get Jewish neighbourhoods in Jerusalem and Palestine will get Arab neighbourhoods in Jerusalem. The Old City will be divided in half, with the Christian and Muslim quarters going to Palestine, and the Jewish and Armenian Quarters going to Israel. Israel will retain control of the Western Wall and there will be a right of prayer on the Temple Mount for Jews.

The agreement would be guaranteed and enforced by monitors from Egypt, Jordan and the United States.
Questions:

1. If the government of Israel accepted this agreement, would you
   a) strongly approve
   b) approve
   c) neither approve nor disapprove
   d) disapprove
   e) strongly disapprove

2. In your view, this agreement is
   a) Totally fair
   b) Mostly fair
   c) Somewhat fair
   d) Neither fair nor unfair
   e) Somewhat unfair
   f) Mostly unfair
   g) Totally unfair

3. Do you agree that such an agreement should be considered for economic reasons, whether or not it is fair?
   a) strongly agree
   b) somewhat agree
   c) neither agree nor disagree
   d) somewhat disagree
   e) strongly disagree

Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.

4. The monitors from Egypt, Jordan and the United States can be trusted to ensure that the new Palestinian state is indeed peaceful and does not become a base of terrorism against Israel
   a) strongly agree
   b) somewhat agree
   c) neither agree nor disagree
   d) somewhat disagree
   e) strongly disagree

5. It is NOT possible for Israel to negotiate a better deal with the PLO than the one described above
   a) strongly agree
   b) somewhat agree
   c) neither agree nor disagree
   d) somewhat disagree
   e) strongly disagree
Version 2: Indignation treatment + Palestinian concession.

השאלות נוגעות הבאות לשיחות ישראל בין לאחרונה שימשו ביווןionalית במדינת פלسطين. בושחת והארה, רמיה וארה ירדן, ממצריים פקחים בידי וייאכף יפוקח ההסכם. ב-

המכסמ שולח קוה ביווןナルית ומגינה פלسطينית וНАטינת חוסה היישרה.

המכסמ שולח קוה ביווןナルית ומגינה פלسطينית וНАטינת חוסה היישרה.

המכסמ שולח קוה ביווןナルית ומגינה פלسطينית וНАטינת חוסה היישרה.

המכסמ שולח קוה ביווןナルית ומגינה פלسطينית וНАטינת חוסה היישרה.

המכסמ שולח קוה ביווןナルית ומגינה פלسطينית וНАטינת חוסה היישרה.

המכסמ שולח קוה ביווןナルית ומגינה פלسطينית וНАטינת חוסה היישרה.

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המכסמ שולח קוה ביווןナルית ומגינה פלسطينית וНАטינת חוסה היישרה.

המכסמ שולח קוה ביווןナルית ומגינה פלسطينית וНАטינת חוסה היישרה.

המכסמ שולח קוה ביווןナルית ומגינה פלسطينית וНАטינת חוסה היישרה.

המכסמ שולח קוה ביווןナルית ומגינה פלسطينית וНАטינת חוסה היישרה.

הכמוסSpiק בהאפקט בייר פ特派员זימ, רמקל "ב".
_questions:  

1. בהנחה שממשלת ישראל תקבל את ההסכם הזה, האם אתה  
   a. תומך במידה רבה מאוד  
   b. תומךilage  
   c. לא תומך ולא מתנגד  
   d. מתנגד ברם  
   e. מתנגד ברם מאוד  

2. בראייתך, האם ההסכם  
   a. הוגן ברם伟大复兴  
   b. הוגן ברם  
   c. לא הוגן ולא בלתי הוגן  
   d. בלתי הוגן ברם  
   e. בלתי הוגן ברם מאוד  

3. באיזו מידה אתה מסכים או מתנגד להצהרות הבאות:  
   a. מסכים ברם伟大复兴  
   b. מסכים ברם  
   c. לא מסכים ולא מתנגד  
   d. מתנגד ברם  
   e. מתנגד ברם מאוד  

4. או הצהרה�  
   a. מסכים ברם伟大复兴  
   b. מסכים ברם  
   c. לא מסכים ולא מתנגד  
   d. מתנגד ברם  
   e. מתנגד ברם מאוד  

5. לא ניתן להגיע להסכם טוב יותר מול הרשות הפלסטינית מזה שתואר קודם לכן.  
   a. מסכים ברם伟大复兴  
   b. מסכים ברם  
   c. לא מסכים ולא מתנגד  
   d. מתנגד ברם  
   e. מתנגד ברם מאוד  

אנא דרג באיזו מידה אתה מסכים או מתנגד להצהרות הבאות:  

א,…
Appendix C: Survey Demographics

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<td>Traditional</td>
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<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ultra Orthodox</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Nat’l Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary or less</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School, no matric.</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School with matric.</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary, no acad. degree.</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s degree</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate degree</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Nat’l Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Far below avg.</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below avg.</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above avg.</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far above avg.</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused to answer</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sample vs. National Census data: Our survey was conducted on an Internet-based panel of Israeli Jews, representatively sampled on the basis of gender, age, religiosity and location of residence.

*The displayed National Census percentage of population that is in the 18 to 24 segment is based on census data regarding 20 to 24 year olds, and thus is in reality likely closer to the sample value of 18. The fact that the sample was Internet based also partially explains why the oldest age segment is underrepresented in our sample and why the youngest segment, ages 18 to 24, is slightly overrepresented.