Cultures of Concession and Conflict:
How the Material and Cultural Context Shapes Crisis Bargaining

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Do different cultures react in fundamentally different ways in international crisis bargaining? Three identical survey experiments in Egypt, Israel and Turkey, and a closely related experiment in the United States, show that power has predictable effects across all societies. The current status quo also has asymmetric effects on population preferences for conflict or cooperation related to an “endowment effect.” These commonalities across societies are dwarfed, however, by the magnitude of the understudied cultural differences in approaches to negotiation and conflict. Egyptian and Turkish leaders have powerful political incentives to fight wars that U.S. leaders do not. The Israeli population occupies a middle ground, and whether its leaders have incentive to negotiate for ever increasing shares of disputed goods or compromise is dependent upon Israel’s relative power.

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With the recent negotiated compromise between the Colombian state and the FARC rebels, war faded from the Western hemisphere.¹ In the Eastern hemisphere, conflicts involving state militaries continue in Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Syria, Turkey, Somalia, Pakistan, Libya, Yemen, Egypt, Sudan, the Ukraine and elsewhere. What explains these starkly different regional experiences in the modern world?

To answer this question, many scholars focus on differences in material factors, like regional distributions of military power, bodies of water separating potential adversaries and the presence of natural resources such as oil. Others examine how state identities influence conflict choices and how psychological biases predispose leaders to certain actions. Less scholarship analyzes how polities differ culturally through systematic data collection and how these differences may influence conflict outcomes. This is surprising since certain states, state dyads, and regions are so much more conflict prone than others.

In this paper, I examine how conflict and cooperation is viewed differently in four societies: Egypt, Israel, Turkey and the United States. I find that changes in the distribution of power have predictable and essentially equivalent effects across all of these societies. One factor that relates to psychological approaches, the current status quo, also has the predicted effect across societies although the magnitude of the effects may differ somewhat between them. The impact of these factors on leaders’ incentives to engage in conflict or cooperation is dwarfed, however, by the understudied cultural differences in approaches to negotiation and conflict.

Three identical survey experiments in Egypt, Israel and Turkey, and a closely related experiment in the United States, show that when states are more powerful, they have incentive to negotiate harder. The difference in approval on a 10 point scale between a 50% share and a 100% share of disputed goods is a full point higher when a state is more powerful than its rival. Increased power creates increased expectations of a settlement outcome and approval of political leaders is lower when these expectations are not met. Interestingly, power influences all societies in a similar fashion, and acts largely independently of other

factors that influence political judgements. Opinion may favor a 50/50 compromise over 100% share, or the reverse, but in both cases, increased power has the same marginal effects.

An almost identical effect occurs when the status quo favors one’s own side. In this experiment, that occurs when one country has been extracting a resource to which both have an equal claim. If the past has been favorable to one side, this shifts leader incentives towards negotiating harder for a more favorable outcome. This occurs independently of changes in the balance of power. If the past has been favorable to the other side, however, this does not shift leader incentives in the opposite direction. Thus, the existence of a status quo that favors one side but does not track commonly recognized political rights will alter the political preferences of the sides in ways that often narrow bargaining ranges and shift incentives towards conflict over compromise.

The results confirm that some previous findings about the relationship between international outcomes and popular approval extend beyond the U.S. context. They also show, however, that the tendency to value 50/50 outcomes or negotiate for larger shares is culturally dependent. Respondents in Egypt and Turkey strongly valued ever-increasing divisions of disputed goods; their preferences are monotonically increasing. U.S. respondents strongly preferred a 50/50 division of resources, however, and Israeli respondents preferred either the 50/50 division or an ever increasing share, depending on the relative power of the Israeli military. Israeli respondents were impacted by shifting power in precisely the way that other respondents were; their preference orderings shift while others do not because their baseline preference for 50/50 divisions versus 100% shares is closer to indifference.

Overall, the findings reveal the importance of cultural spaces as determinants of foreign policy preferences. While more traditional determinants of foreign policy interests, such as the balance of power and the location of the status quo, influence all respondents similarly, the magnitudes of the shifts in preferences resulting from cultural difference are much greater. Respondents in Turkey and Egypt would be willing to fight wars that respondents in the United States, and to a lesser extent in Israel, would not be willing to
fight. Thus, the heightened propensities of some states, regions and dyads to engage in conflicts may be largely explained by cultural difference.

**Culture and the Origins of Preferences**

A variety of scholarly traditions study the how differences in values and preferences influence foreign policy. Constructivist scholars have long argued that differing state identities shape behavior in the international system.\(^2\) Consistent with this scholarship, psychologists and sociologists have noted that these values and preferences differ substantially across cultures (Schwartz 1992, Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan 2010). Political scientists have demonstrated that differences in fundamental moral values within states predict foreign policy preferences (Kertzer et al. 2014). Dafoe and Caughey (2016) show, for instance, that participating in the Southern honor culture heightens likelihood that a U.S. president employs force in an international dispute.\(^3\) Thus, taking these findings together, there are strong reasons to believe that these cultural differences will result in different approaches to foreign policy.

Nevertheless, systematic collection and analysis of cross-national data on differences in foreign policy preferences has been rare. Stein (2015) and Liberman (2006) show that death penalty support can proxy for how retributive population preferences are and that this predicts engagement in conflict. Kertzer and Rathbun (2015) and Bertoli, Dafoe and Trager (2016) argue that differences in fundamental moral values that are associated with party differences apply cross-nationally and predict differing levels of conflict among politicians of the right and left. A significant literature analyzes Huntington’s (1997) clash of civilizations thesis and largely finds a lack of support (Chiozza 2002). It is telling, however, that these studies all rely on proxies for variation in the preferences of populations and their leaders - be it the death penalty support or party differences.

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\(^2\)For overviews of this literature, see Checkel (1998) and Adler (2013).

\(^3\)On honor cultures, see Nisbett and Cohen (1996).
penalty, party allegiance or civilizational boundaries. None of these studies analyzes data on how foreign policy preferences actually differ across polities.

This study begins to fill this gap by collecting data on foreign policy preferences in a controlled fashion across four countries. It analyzes cross-national differences in political preferences alongside more traditional determinants of foreign policy preferences from the international relations literature. This enables a calibration of the magnitude and importance of cross-national differences. I now discuss two hypotheses drawn from the international relations and psychology literatures before turning again to the effects of cultural difference.

Some political scientists argue that state actions can be understood as self-interested calculations of military might and material advantage (Mearsheimer 2001). Psychologists have also demonstrated that moral judgments are influenced by calculations of interest. Moral reasoning is sometimes a gloss on calculations of interest, even when reasoners are unaware that this is so (Gazzaniga 1985, Wilson 2004). Individuals can always give moral reasons for their actions (Haidt 2001), but their decisions and their views on right and wrong are swayed by self-interest and immediate moral intuitions. Thus, we expect that the willingness to compromise in an international dispute will be related to self-interest and therefore to relative military power. Further, we expect that power will influence both what settlements of disputes are considered fair and what settlements garner popular approval. This is captured in the Power in Negotiations Hypothesis, which states that greater military power relative to adversaries increases the approval of more favorable negotiated outcomes relative to less favorable outcomes. While we state this hypothesis generally for clarity of exposition, in testing it, we will examine primarily whether increased power increases the difference in approval when a state receives (1) a 100% share of a good versus a 0% share and (2) a 100% share versus a 50% share. We shall also examine the extent to which shifts in views about fairness mediate shifts in approval.
**Power in Negotiations Hypothesis:** Greater military power increases the approval of more favorable negotiated outcomes relative to less favorable outcomes.

Scholars have also examined how the existing status quo influences the likelihood of conflict. Powell (1999) argues on rationalist grounds in the context of alternating offer bargaining that disjunctures between the balance of power and the balance of goods in the current status quo leads to conflict. The psychology literature, however, makes a more direct prediction that is tested here. Individuals and groups develop attachments to goods that are possessed in some fashion and find these harder to give up (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1991). This leads to an interesting asymmetric prediction: the status quo favoring one’s side increases the approval of more favorable negotiated outcomes relative to less favorable outcomes. These dynamics are captured in the Status Quo in Negotiations Hypothesis. We test this idea by varying what the status quo is, without varying markers of what the status quo ought to be. Therefore, we do not expect to find the symmetric result that the Status Quo favoring the other side decreases the approval of more favorable negotiated outcomes for one’s own side relative to less favorable outcomes. Thus, this so-called “endowment effect” can push the sides toward conflict when there is a separation between “is” and “ought” (Kahneman and Renshon 2007).

**Status Quo in Negotiations Hypothesis:** The status quo favoring one’s side increases the approval of more favorable negotiated outcomes relative to less favorable outcomes.

Previous research has shown that U.S. publics prefer 50/50 outcomes in international negotiations in the absence of another fairness prime (Gottfried and Trager 2016). While the equal division has been shown to be a powerful norm for many people in a variety of contexts and cultures (Camerer 1997; Güth and Schwarze 1982; Kahneman and Thaler 1986; Thaler 1988; Güth 1995), however, there is also
significant variation across cultures in the degree to which people seek equal divisions or take more when the opportunity presents itself. This leads to an expectation that similar variation will be evident in international bargaining contexts and will influence the degree to which publics support 50/50 outcomes relative the 0% and 100% shares. This expectation is stated in a general way as the Culture of Negotiating Hypothesis.

Culture of Negotiating Hypothesis: Different cultures will have different negotiating preferences, including differences in the approval of the 50/50 outcome and willingness to compromise or seek maximalist negotiated outcomes.

Experimental Design

To analyze these issues, we conducted survey experiments on representative samples of the populations of Egypt, Israel, Turkey and the United States during the month of July, 2016. The numbers of respondents from each country were, respectively, 1,029, 1,382, 1,141 and 2,003. All experiments were administered over the internet in the language of the country. Appendix E contains further information about polling procedures and a comparison of survey demographics to the national census in each country.

The surveys were designed so that responses would be as comparable as possible. The surveys administered in Egypt, Israel and Turkey were identical and described a conflict over resources in the seabed under the Mediterranean Sea. Respondents were told their country (Egypt, Israel or Turkey) and another country had made contradictory claims under international law and that both wished to extract “oil, gas and gas-hydrates, which scientists believe will become the worlds next alternative energy source.” Respondents were then told that their country (Egypt/Israel/Turkey) “and the other country agreed to postpone exploitation of the area’s resources until a further determination by the United Nations.”
They were then randomly shown one of four treatments or assigned to a control group. The first two treatments of the four concerned the *status quo*. Respondents were told that “in the past, Egypt/Israel/Turkey has regularly enabled Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish firms to extract resources from the area, while the other country was not engaged in the area,” or that the other country had enable it’s country’s firms while Egypt/Israel/Turkey was not engaged in the area. The third and fourth treatments concerned whether a commitment had been violated. Respondent were told either that “the other country has enabled its country’s firms to violate [the agreement to postpone exploitation of resources], and they have begun extracting the resources on a massive scale” or that Egypt/Israel/Turkey had done so. The control group was not told either about the *status quo* or that one country had violated the agreement.

Respondents were then shown one of two power treatments. Half were told that “Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish military capabilities in the region far exceed those of the other country. Military officials were confident that any resulting conflict would be quickly settled in favor of Egypt/Israel/Turkey.” The other half were told that “The capabilities of the two countries are relatively evenly matched. Military officials believed that any resulting conflict would involve significant casualties on both sides.” These treatments were chosen because they were plausible for all three countries in the study when the adversary country was not identified. The two power treatments were fully crossed with the first group of treatments.

Following these two treatment groups, respondents were asked a series of questions about their approval of differing shares for the two countries in a settlement, as well as the drivers of these responses. Respondents were also given attention and manipulation checks. Finally, all respondents were assigned one of two additional treatments. They were told to “suppose that instead of a deal being signed, negotiations ended abruptly” and that a conflict ensued in which 1,100 Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish troops and a similar number of troops from the opposing country died. We randomly varied which side emerged victorious. Half of respondents were told that “the Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish government decided to withdraw its forces and the other country took complete control of the resource-rich region,” and the other half were told reverse.
This design allowed for pairwise comparisons of treatment effects on approval of settlements and conflict, thereby allowing for more precise estimates of effects.

The U.S. experiment was similar, but of course could not revolve around a claim to resources in the Mediterranean Sea. Instead, a similar dispute was described in the Arctic and Russia was named as the U.S. adversary. The decision to name Russia was made for realism in the power manipulation treatment: only Russia might reasonably be expected to defeat the U.S. in a local conflict in the Arctic. To make it clear that the dispute was a significant economic interest of a country the size of the United States, participants were told that “Over 25% of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas are beneath the Arctic seabed, and portions of the ice contain gas-hydrates, which scientists believe will become the world’s next alternative energy source.” Participants were also given information about the competing U.S. and Russian claims to the resources under international law and told that the United Nations had ruled that the evidence presented by each country in favor of its claim was “inconclusive.”

Other aspects of the experiment follow the experiments in other countries closely with two exceptions. First, the U.S. experiment contained no status quo manipulations. Second, the power treatments specified that Defense Department planners were confident that a “local” conflict would be quickly settled by one side or the other.

Results

All three hypotheses are strongly supported, but the magnitudes of the effects vary greatly. The power treatments had similar effects across all four countries, supporting the Power in Negotiations Hypothesis. In Egypt, the increase in approval of a negotiated solution on a 10-point scale from a 50/50 outcome to a 100% share of the resources was 45% when Egypt was more powerful versus 30% when the powers were evenly matched. This effect is on the margin of statistical significance ($p = .07$). In other countries the estimated effects were larger. In Israel, approval increased 15% for a 100% share over the 50/50 outcome.
when Israel is the more powerful adversary whereas approval declines by 8% when Israel is evenly matched ($p < .0001$). In Turkey, power lead to a 44% increase versus a 22% increase when the countries are evenly matched ($p = .02$). In the U.S., approval falls 22% when the U.S. is powerful and 30% when Russia is ($p < .03$). Thus, a similar effect of power was observed in all populations despite their different evaluations of the relative merits of a compromise solution. The overall effects of power across all populations were highly significant and are shown in Figure 1. The results for the differences between the 0% share outcomes and the 100% share outcomes are also all in the predicted direction. They are significant at conventional levels in the U.S. and Turkey, on the margin of significance in Israel and somewhat less significant in Egypt. The overall effect is highly significant ($p < .0001$).

Changes in the status quo have effects of almost the same magnitude across populations. The effects in Israel and Turkey are highly significant and the effect in Egypt is on the margin of significance ($p = .07$ for the 100% share versus 50% share comparison and $p = .12$ for 100% versus 0%). Once again, the overall effect across countries is highly significant ($p < .0001$ for the 100% versus 50% shares and $p < .01$ for 100% versus 0%). The overall effects are shown in Figure 2.

Finally, the effects of participation in different polities are massive and can be seen in Figure 4. The Figure plots the range of mean approval levels for each country across shares of a negotiated solution on a normalized scale where approval at the end points is fixed at 0 and 1. Egypt and Turkey are nearly identical, but these are very different from each of the other two. While most Egyptians and Turks strongly prefer that their governments negotiate for all of the available disputed resources, most Israelis are statistically indifferent between a 50/50 outcome and a 100% share, and U.S. respondents strongly preferred that the U.S. compromise on an equal share for each side. All of these differences are of course highly significant. The difference between the 50/50 and 100% share outcomes for Egypt and Israel, for instance, has a $p$-value of less than 0.000000000001.

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4 Recall that the U.S. experiment included no status quo treatments.
Figure 1. How Power Influences Negotiation Preferences

Mean Approval (1-10 Scale)

Share of Negotiated Outcome

Power High

0% vs 100%
0% vs 50%
50% vs 100%

Difference in Approval at Negotiated Outcomes

Power Even

Power High
Figure 2. How the Status Quo Influences Negotiation Preferences

- **Top Graph:**
  - X-axis: Share of Negotiated Solution (0% to 100%)
  - Y-axis: Mean Approval (1-10 Scale)
  - Lines represent:
    - Control
    - SQ Favors
    - SQ Against

- **Bottom Graph:**
  - X-axis: Difference in Approval at Negotiated Outcomes
  - Y-axis: Approval Levels (0.5 to 3.5)
  - Categories:
    - 0% vs 100%
    - 0% vs 50%
    - 50% vs 100%
  - Colors represent:
    - Control
    - SQ Favors
    - SQ Against
Figure 3. How Polities Differ in Negotiation Preferences
The Israeli case is interesting because it shows how culture and power-political considerations interact. Because the Israeli public is close to indifferent between the equal compromise and 100% share outcomes, whether Israeli leaders have incentive to negotiate for maximalist shares depends on Israeli expectations about the relative power of the sides. As Figure 4 illustrates, Israeli preferences are non-satiated when Israel is powerful and peak at 50% when Israel is evenly matched militarily. The positive relationship between increased share past an equal division when Israeli power is high and the negative relationship when Israeli power is lower can each be distinguished from zero ($p = .0001$ and $p = .01$ respectively using paired two-tailed tests).

**Discussion**

The results demonstrate that cultural differences have huge impacts on predispositions towards conflict and cooperation relative to several more commonly theorized factors. The implications for conflict behavior
are substantial if leaders are responsive to popular preferences or hold those same preferences themselves. There are reasons to believe that both are often the case. As Stein (2015) argues with force and clarity, the predispositions of publics influence what is politically salient and therefore what elite calls to action will resonate. Public predispositions appear to be a sort of permissive cause of international behavior. In addition, leaders usually come from the societies they head and are products of them; there is reason to believe they think in similar ways.

To understand how conflict behavior may therefore be influenced by cultural difference, I shall take these popular preferences measured above as a measure state preferences. The question I now turn to is how these preferences influence two kinds of wars: Sought Wars, which occur when there is no negotiated solution that both sides prefer to conflict, and Inadvertent Wars which occur when both sides would prefer a compromise but war occurs as a result of bargaining dynamics. Fearon (1995) shows that Sought Wars never occur when states are assumed to be risk averse and prefer ever more of disputed goods. Equating popular and state preferences, however, these assumptions are violated in this data, and thus it is useful to ask when this makes war more likely. Inadvertent Wars occur because, as Fearon (1995) argues, it is in their interests for states to risk war in pursuit of gain. Which combinations of states are likely to fight both types of wars and under what conditions?

Figure 5 plots settlement approval alongside approval for winning and losing a conflict for each country, making the stark differences in cultural predispositions toward conflict and cooperation even more apparent. States with U.S. style preferences will not fight either sort of war with another state with similar preferences. In conflicts like the one described in the vignette, both sides prefer an equal division of the goods and thus the preferences of the one do not conflict with the preferences of the other. Even a victorious war is a

5For statistical analysis of these assumptions on a related dataset, see Gottfried and Trager (2016). Related tests on the data analyzed here show with an extremely high degree of certainty that the traditional rationalist assumptions of concavity and non-satiation do not hold.
Figure 5. To Compromise or Fight?
distant second to this division of the resources \((p < .00001)\). Only if the sides failed to recognize each other’s types and each insisted on a greater than 50/50 division out of a fear of otherwise receiving less than the 50/50 division would an Inadvertent War be possible. While such an outcome can be sustained as an equilibrium in a rationalist model, and may occur when trust is at its lowest ebb, such a state of affairs is unnecessarily inefficient and is unlikely to occur frequently or persist for long (Kydd 2005, Kydd 1997, Morrow 2014).

Leaders in states with Turkish or Egyptian style preferences have much more incentive to fight both kinds of wars. To prefer a negotiated outcome to a war that is lost, both countries must receive more than 60% of the good. Thus, no negotiated solution will ever satisfy both sides when both have preferences of this form; they are likely to fight Sought Wars. In fact, Turkey is statistically indifferent between a victorious war in which 1,100 Turkish troops die and a negotiated outcome in which it receives all of the resources without fighting \((p < .27\) for the two-tailed test that Turkey prefers success through war to success through negotiation). Since the most preferred negotiated outcome for each is when it receives all of the good, these states also have incentive to negotiate the hardest. Thus, even if a war were even more costly than the one described in the vignette, and thus less popular, these states might mistake the intentions of the other and thus engage in an Inadvertent War.

[[Further analysis of the types of wars that states with these types of implied preferences are likely to fight to come.]]

**Conclusion**

Some scholars shy from the analysis of cultural difference. Such an approach to conflict studies can seem like an expression of cultural biases. Rationalist approaches comfortably avoid the issue by bracketing non-material sources of preference differences. Even constructivists sometimes theorize the influence of identity rather than examine how contemporary identities differ. Attempts to collect systematic cross-
national data on the values and preferences that relate to international conflict are rarer still. But cultural
difference appears to influence leader incentives for war and peace profoundly, in ways that may dwarf
more commonly analyzed sources of state actions.
References


Kertzer, Joshua D and Brian C Rathbun. 2015. “Fair is Fair: Social Preferences and Reciprocity in International Politics.”


Appendix A: Survey Experiment Text in English

Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish Foreign Policy

The following questions are about Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish foreign policy. You will read about a situation similar to those the country has faced in the past and may face again in the future. Different leaders have handled the situation in different ways. We will describe one approach Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish leaders have taken and ask for your thoughts on that approach.

The Situation

Egypt/Israel/Turkey and another country have a longstanding dispute over a resource-rich area in the seabed under the Mediterranean Sea. Both countries claim the right to extract oil, gas and gas-hydrates, which scientists believe will become the world’s next alternative energy source. Both countries have made contradictory claims to the area under international law.

[Treatment 1]

(Respondents are put into one of the following treatment groups at random – Transgr. Treatment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Egypt/Israel/Turkey and the other country agreed to postpone exploitation of the area’s resources until a further determination by the United Nations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b</td>
<td>Egypt/Israel/Turkey and the other country agreed to postpone exploitation of the area’s resources until a further determination by the United Nations. In the past, Egypt/Israel/Turkey has regularly enabled Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish firms to extract resources from the area, while the other country was not engaged in the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1c</td>
<td>Egypt/Israel/Turkey and the other country agreed to postpone exploitation of the area’s resources until a further determination by the United Nations. In the past, the other country has regularly enabled its country’s firms to extract resources from the area, while Egypt/Israel/Turkey was not engaged in the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1d</td>
<td>Egypt/Israel/Turkey and the other country agreed to postpone exploitation of the area’s resources until a further determination by the United Nations. However, the other country has enabled its country’s firms to violate this agreement, and they have begun extracting the resources on a massive scale.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1e</td>
<td>Egypt/Israel/Turkey and the other country agreed to postpone exploitation of the area’s resources until a further determination by the United Nations. However, Egypt/Israel/Turkey has enabled Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish firms to violate this agreement, and they have begun extracting the resources on a massive scale.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

[Treatment 2]

(Respondents are put into one of the following treatment groups at random – Power Treatment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2a</td>
<td>Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish military capabilities in the region far exceed those of the other country. Military officials were confident that any resulting conflict would be quickly settled in favor of Egypt/Israel/Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b</td>
<td>The capabilities of the two countries are relatively evenly matched. Military officials believed that any resulting conflict would involve significant casualties on both sides.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Following several months of negotiations, Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish leaders announced that a deal had been reached between the sides. Some groups were critical of the government’s actions, while others argued that the government had been firm but prudent.

1. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 indicates maximum approval, how much would you approve of the way the government handled the situation if, according to the deal,

   a. The other country will receive rights to *all* of the disputed resource-rich area.
   b. Egypt/Israel/Turkey will receive rights to 30% of the disputed resource-rich area and the other country will receive 70%.
   c. Egypt/Israel/Turkey will receive rights to 40% of the disputed resource-rich area and the other country will receive 60%.
   d. Egypt/Israel/Turkey will receive rights to 50% of the disputed resource-rich area and the other country will receive 50%.
   e. Egypt/Israel/Turkey will receive rights to 60% of the disputed resource-rich area and the other country will receive 40%.
   f. Egypt/Israel/Turkey will receive rights to 70% of the disputed resource-rich area and the other country will receive 30%.
   g. Egypt/Israel/Turkey will receive rights to *all* of the disputed resource-rich area.

2. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 indicates total agreement, how much do you agree with each of the following statements?

   a. The other country should be punished for its conduct.
   b. The most important thing is for Egypt/Israel/Turkey to avoid a bloody conflict with the other country.
   c. Negotiation of a fair agreement is one of the most important considerations.
   d. A substantial compromise with the other country is likely the best deal that can be negotiated.
   e. A negotiated compromise that is favorable to the other country will cause Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish enemies to challenge Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish interests and Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish allies to question Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish reliability.
   f. A negotiated compromise is in the interests of both sides. Please mark that you Neither Agree Nor Disagree to ensure you are paying attention.
   g. A country should **not** have the right to use military force for political purposes without U.N. approval.

3. In situations like this, on a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 indicates total agreement, how much do you approve of the use of force by Egypt/Israel/Turkey when necessary?
Now suppose that instead of a deal being signed, [Treatment 3]

| Treatment 3a | negotiations ended abruptly. Following a tense standoff between Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish forces and the military of the other country, the sides exchanged fire. Over 1,100 Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish troops, and a similar number of the other country’s troops, died in the conflict, but militarily the other country had the upper hand in the dispute. The Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish government decided to withdraw its forces and the other country took complete control of the resource-rich region. |
| Treatment 3b | negotiations ended abruptly. Following a tense standoff between Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish forces and the military of the other country, the sides exchanged fire. Over 1,100 Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish troops, and a similar number of the other country’s troops, died in the conflict, but militarily Egypt/Israel/Turkey had the upper hand in the dispute. The other country decided to withdraw its forces and Egypt/Israel/Turkey took complete control of the resource-rich region. |

1. In this case, on a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 indicates maximum approval, how much would you approve of the way the government handled the situation?

2. On a scale of 1 to 10, which 10 indicates maximum approval, how much do you agree with each of the following statements?
   - The Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish government was too moderate in the conduct of foreign policy.
   - The Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish government was too aggressive in the conduct of foreign policy.
   - The other country deserved this outcome because of its conduct.
   - Egypt/Israel/Turkey deserved this outcome because of its conduct.
   - Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish actions were appropriate due to its economic interest in the outcome.
   - The other country’s actions were appropriate due to its economic interest in the outcome.

3. In the scenarios described above, which country was described as violating an agreement by enabling companies to extract resources from the region?
   a. Egypt/Israel/Turkey
   b. The other country
   c. Neither Egypt/Israel/Turkey nor the other country.

4. In the scenarios described above, military officials were confident that any local conflict would be quickly settled in favor of which state?
   a. Egypt/Israel/Turkey
   b. Neither Egypt/Israel/Turkey nor the other country.
Appendix B: Survey Experiment Text in Hebrew

[To come]
Appendix C: Survey Experiment Text in Arabic

[To come]
Appendix D: Survey Experiment Text in Turkish

[To come]
Appendix E: Survey Demographics

In Egypt and Turkey, the polls were conducted by local firms affiliated with the Cint network of panels. The Israel experiment was conducted by the Sarid Institute for Research Services. Survey Sampling International administered the survey in the United States. In all countries except the United States, the sample skews somewhat towards young, educated males.
## Egypt

### Gender:

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<td>77%</td>
<td>48%</td>
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<td>Female</td>
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<td>52%</td>
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### Age:

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<td>16%</td>
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<td>55+</td>
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<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Region:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Said</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damietta</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dakahlia</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qaliubiya</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafr El Sheikh</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monoufia</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The lake</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismailia</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giza</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Israel

Gender:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Age:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-74</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75+</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Region:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>North and Haifa</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>&quot;Sharon&quot; and Samaria</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Center and the Dan</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>&quot;Shfela&quot; and South</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turkey

Gender:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Age (18-80):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-22</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-35</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-55</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56-80</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Region:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Area (EN)</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>tuik symb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akdeniz Bölgesi</td>
<td>The Mediterranean region</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>TR6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doğu Anadolu Bölgesi</td>
<td>East Anatolia Region</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>TRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ege Bölgesi</td>
<td>Aegean Region</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>TR3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İç Anadolu Bölgesi</td>
<td>Central Anatolia Region</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>TRB;TR7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgesi</td>
<td>Southeastern Anatolia Region</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>TRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karadeniz Bölgesi</td>
<td>Black Sea region</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>TR8; TR9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marmara Bölgesi</td>
<td>Marmara Region</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>TR1;TR2; TR4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>